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REPORT 
 
ATHLETIC DIRECTORS 
MARTIN J. GREENBERG* & ALEXANDER W. EVRARD** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION – DEFINITION  
 An athletic director, more commonly referred to as an “AD,” is the  
overseer of a university’s athletic enterprise, the chief executive officer (CEO) 
of the athletic enterprise. In most instances, an athletic director is not a faculty 
member, but a full-time administrator. In some instances, such as in the case of 
David Williams at Vanderbilt University, the title is greater than that of athletic 
director. Williams is not only an athletic director but also the Vice Chancellor 
for Athletics and University Affairs. The athletic director is probably not as 
well-known as the university’s head football or basketball coach, but his profile, 
especially at large revenue producing programs, has been enhanced. In many 
instances, athletic directors are not compensated as well as some of their head 
coaches, but the demands of their jobs are similar to the demands of a CEO of 
a major corporation.  
 Today, the role of athletic directors has been greatly expanded. Their job 
is 24/7. No longer do they just manage an athletic enterprise, as their  
responsibilities may include 
 
1. negotiating multi-million dollar media and licensing rights 
                                                          
* Martin J. Greenberg is the managing member of the Law Office of Martin J. Greenberg, LLC, a 
member of the National Sports Law Institute Board of Advisors, and an adjunct professor of law at 
Marquette University Law School. 
** Alexander W. Evrard is an attorney in Milwaukee, Wisconsin who will complete his M.B.A. in 
June 2016 from Marquette University Graduate School of Management.  He graduated from Marquette 
University Law School in May 2015.  Previously, he earned a B.G.S. in Economics and a minor in 
Business Administration from the University of Kansas in May 2012.  Mr. Evrard would like to thank 
Martin J. Greenberg for this opportunity and for serving as an invaluable professor and mentor.  He 
would also like to thank his parents, Rick and Peggy, for their unconditional love and support.  And a 
special thanks to his uncle and aunt, Doug and Tracey, for providing a home away from home. 
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agreements; 
2. managing coaches who are “CEOs in Headphones” and the 
highest paid state employees in a free agent environment; 
3. acting as a legal wizard to master the compliance standards 
expected of him and his programs by the NCAA, conference, 
and university; 
4. acting as a development specialist, dealing with capital  
projects essential to keeping pace in the arms race of college 
sports; 
5. being a skilled businessman, dealing with balancing budgets, 
controlling expenses, creating new revenues, and mastering the 
bottom line; 
6. displaying excellence in peer relationships in dealing with 
his partners in the world of college conferences and what has 
now become a re-alignment environment; 
7. understanding the importance of academics to the athletic 
enterprise and knowing the place of athletics within the  
university environment; 
8. serving as a master fundraiser, an expert at donor relations, 
in that fundraising is an intricate component of the revenues 
generated by universities; and 
9. acting as a human resource strategist, in that athletic  
departments are large employers, having many employees and 
staff. 
II. JOB ENVIRONMENT 
 The job itself has become a much more sophisticated and pedigreed job 
that requires experience and more formalized education. However, most of all, 
the athletic director of today is the director of a big business. According to a 
USA Today report, the average conference athletic department revenues for the 
2013–2014 academic year were:  
 
Big Ten                              $108.8 million 
SEC                                    $105.3 million 
Big 12                                $100.1 million 
Pac-12                                $88.6 million 
ACC                                   $79 million 
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American                           $60.6 million 
Mountain West                  $38.2 million 
Conference USA                $29.3 million 
MAC                                  $27.5 million 
A-10                                   $27.1 million 
CAA                                   $25.7 million 
Sun Belt                              $20.9 million 
Big West                             $20.6 million1 
 
Revenues can skyrocket into the hundreds of millions. According to the 
2013–2014 USA Today report, twenty universities generated more than $100 
million in revenues and sixteen universities spent more than $100 million in 
expenses,2 as shown by the chart below. 
 
SCHOOL CONFERENCE REVENUE EXPENSES 
Oregon Pac-12 $196,030,398 $110,378,432 
Texas Big 12 $161,035,187 $154,128,877 
Michigan Big Ten $157,899,820 $142,551,994 
Alabama SEC $153,234,273 $120,184,128 
Ohio State Big Ten $145,232,681 $113,937,001 
LSU SEC $133,679,256 $122,945,710 
Oklahoma Big 12 $129,226,692 $113,366,698 
Wisconsin Big Ten $127,910,918 $125,096,235 
Florida SEC $124,611,305 $109,690,016 
                                                          
1. See NCAA Finances, USA TODAY SPORTS, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/ (last  
visited May 8, 2016). 
2. Id. 
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Texas 
A&M 
SEC $119,475,872 $95,663,483 
Oklahoma 
State 
Big 12 $117,803,302 $109,648,000 
Penn State Big Ten $117,590,990 $117,440,639 
Auburn SEC $113,716,004 $126,470,602 
Tennessee SEC $107,499,732 $106,153,854 
Minnesota Big Ten $106,176,156 $106,176,156 
Iowa Big Ten $105,958,954 $102,278,847 
Florida 
State 
ACC $104,774,474 $98,866,182 
Michigan 
State 
Big Ten $104,677,456 $107,422,832 
Georgia SEC $103,495,587 $92,560,956 
Washing-
ton 
Pac-12 $100,275,187 $86,097,137 
Arizona Pac-12 $99,911,034 $95,524,260 
South Car-
olina 
SEC $98,619,479 $95,762,786 
Kansas Big 12 $97,681,066 $90,056,511 
Arkansas SEC $96,793,972 $94,640,408 
Kentucky SEC $96,685,489 $94,612,431 
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 Research identifies several common paths that current athletic directors 
took to arrive at their positions as head athletic directors.3 These paths include: 
 
1.Head Coach Path (i.e., from head coach of a sport to athletic 
director), such as Barry Alvarez of the University of Wisconsin, 
Mike Holder of Oklahoma State University, Debbie Yow of 
North Carolina State University, and Ray Tanner of the  
University of South Carolina; 
2.Athletic Administration Path (i.e., working their way up 
through an athletic department), such as Kirby Hocutt of Texas 
Tech University, Brad Bates of Boston College, and Bubba 
Cunningham of the University of North Carolina; 
3.Sports Management Education Path (i.e., athletic directors 
who pursued graduate studies in the field of sports management 
to prepare for their careers), such as Sandy Barbour of Penn 
State University, Jeremy Foley of the University of Florida, Ian 
McCaw of Baylor University, Bob DeCarolis of Oregon State 
University, and Bernard Muir of Stanford University;  
4.Sports Industry Experience Path (i.e., non-college sports  
industry experience to athletic director), such as Ray Anderson 
of Arizona State University, Rick George of the University of 
Colorado, Jack Swarbrick of the University of Notre Dame, and 
Stephen Patterson formerly of the University of Texas; and 
5.Business Experience Path (i.e., major corporate and business 
experience to athletic director), such as Dave Brandon formerly 
of the University of Michigan and Pat Haden of the University 
of Southern California.4  
 
 “As college sports have become increasingly big businesses, more  
institutions have made similar assessments and turned to outside business  
executives to run their programs – but it’s not yet clear that the shift in preferred 
skill sets is paying off.”5 
 
                                                          
3. See Glenn M. Wong, The Path to the Athletic Director’s Office, SPORTS BUS. J. (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2014/06/09/In-Depth/Wong-column.aspx.  
4. Id. 
5. Jake New, What CEOs Don’t Know, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.insidehigh-
ered.com/news/2014/11/07/colleges-turn-athletics-directors-business-backgrounds-results-vary.  
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When the University of Michigan chose David Brandon to be 
its athletics director in 2010, the university touted his  
experience as the chief executive officer of Domino’s Pizza. At 
the time, the university saw his understanding of how to run a 
multibillion-dollar company as a fitting background for running 
a big-time college sports program. 
. . . . 
About 10 percent of Division I colleges currently have athletic 
directors with backgrounds in business rather than college 
sports. Nine out of the 65 institutions that make up the so-called 
Power 5 conferences have hired executives to run their sports 
programs. Glenn Wong, a sports management professor at the 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, said the number of 
schools may still be relatively small, but they’re part of a larger 
trend.  
 
“The trend is that schools will now consider athletic director 
candidates with nontraditional backgrounds,” Wong said. “In 
fact, they may even seek them out. But institutions vary  
considerably in terms of what they are looking for in an athletic 
director. It can vary from one hire to the next. For example, an 
athletic director may be brought in to clean up after an NCAA 
problem, and the next hire may be someone with strength in 
fund raising.”6 
 
A University of Michigan (Michigan) alumnus, David Brandon, played 
football under Bo Schembechler and was a member of three Big Ten  
Championship teams.7  He received  
 
a Bachelor of Arts degree in education and teaching . . . from 
[Michigan] in 1974. . . .  He was elected to the Board of  
Regents in 1998 and served one eight-year term. In 2007 he 
received the Distinguished Alumni Service Award from the 
[Michigan] Alumni Association. In 2008 he received the  
Bennie Oosterbaan Award for service, dedication and  
                                                          
6. Id. 
7. Kim Broekhuizen, David Brandon Named Director of Intercollegiate Athletics, U. MICH. 
OFFICIAL ATHLETIC SITE (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.mgoblue.com/genrel/010510aab.html. 
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leadership from the Bob Ufer Quarterback Club. Later that year 
Brandon was honored as national CEO Coach of the Year by 
the American Football Coaches Association.8   
 
Prior to joining the athletic department, Brandon served as Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer of Ann Arbor-based Domino's Pizza, Inc. for eleven 
years, leading the company to the largest initial public offering (IPO) of a  
restaurant company in history.9  He continues to serve as non-executive  
Chairman at Domino’s and also serves as a member of the Board of Directors 
of Herman Miller and DTE Energy. Prior to his role with Domino’s, Brandon 
served as Chairman, President, and CEO of Valassis Communications, Inc.10 
While Brandon was the athletic director at Michigan, he increased revenues, 
improved facilities, won games, and consistently brought in a profit for the  
athletic department, which is rare for collegiate athletics; however, in the end, 
students and alumni alike called for his dismissal.  Why?  One contributing  
factor is that Brandon repeatedly tried to break, and did break, traditions at 
Michigan in attempts to improve components of the athletic program.  In 2011, 
Brandon “raised ticket prices for the first time in seven years” and altered the 
traditional football jerseys.11  He was criticized for trying to bring back retired 
jersey numbers and put them on special players.12  Additionally, Brandon made 
alternate uniforms for the football team to wear to surprise the fans.13  The 
Board of Regents criticized Brandon for trying to shoot off fireworks during 
home games at Michigan Stadium (The Big House), claiming it would cheapen 
the traditional game-day experience.14   
Brandon alienated students and other fans by increasing ticket prices and 
changing student seating arrangements.  Instead of running Michigan like a 
business, Brandon was running Michigan as a business.  Former Michigan  
athletic director Bill Martin once said to Brandon, “[j]ust because you can 
charge them more . . . doesn’t mean you should.  You’re not there to ring up the 
cash to the nth degree.  It’s a nonprofit model!”15  This is illustrated by the wait 
                                                          
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. David Jesse & Mark Snyder, Michigan Athletic Director Dave Brandon Resigns, USA TODAY 
(Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/10/31/michigan-athletic-director-
dave-brandon/18236245/. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. John U. Bacon, How Michigan’s Greed Alienated Fans: A Cautionary Tale for All College 
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list for Michigan football tickets.16  Back when multi-millionaire businessman 
Don Canham was athletic director at Michigan, he knew that he could maximize 
revenue by increasing prices to meet demand.17  However, he did not increase 
ticket prices “because he believed that would dispel the magic of Michigan  
Stadium.”18  Similarly, Brandon’s predecessor Bill Martin actually lowered 
ticket prices after the 2008 recession, and the wait list held strong even after two 
terrible losing seasons in 2008 and 2009.19  As of 2014, after Brandon increased 
ticket prices and also phased in a personal seat license, which requires every 
season-ticket holder to pay a fee for the right to buy tickets, the wait list  
disappeared.20   
Brandon also created friction with the student body by raising ticket prices 
from $195 for six games to $295 for seven games.21  Additionally, Brandon 
broke a decade’s long tradition by rearranging student seating from being based 
on seniority to a first-come, first-served system.22  In 2014, Michigan student 
body president Bobby Dishell stated that, “[d]rastic measures need to be taken 
to demonstrate the athletic department values its students beyond the revenue 
dollars they bring in when they purchase tickets.”23 
Fans prepared an organized protest “White Out, Dave Out,” wearing  
anti-Brandon T-shirts for Michigan’s 2014 homecoming game against the  
University of Indiana.24  Brandon finally resigned in October of 2014, even 
though his contract was extended through June 2018.25  Brandon was replaced 
on an interim basis by Jim Hackett, a 1977 Michigan graduate and former  
football team member under coach Bo Schembechler, who returned to Michigan 
after two decades as Chief Executive Officer of Grand Rapids-based SteelCase, 
Inc., one of the world’s largest office furniture makers.26  
Hackett’s appointment letter with Michigan is dated October 31, 2014, the 
                                                          
Football, THEPOSTGAME (June 23, 2014), http://www.thepostgame.com/blog/road-saturday/201406/ 
college-football-fan-stadium-students-business-tv-ncaa-michigan-tickets. 
16. Id.  
17. Id.  
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. See id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Jesse & Snyder, supra note 11.  
24. Id. 
25. See id. 
26. Id. 
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same day as Brandon’s resignation.27  The letter outlines the terms of his  
indefinite appointment and calls for an annual salary of $600,000.28   
Meanwhile, Brandon executed a Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims 
with Michigan, dated October 30, 2014, in which he would be compensated for 
the remaining term of his contract.29  
Stephen Patterson (Patterson) obtained his undergraduate and law degrees 
from the University of Texas (UT or Texas)30 and experienced first-hand the 
transformative power of the Forty Acres.  “He succeeded DeLoss Dodds who 
served as UT men’s athletics director from 1981-2013.”31  Prior to serving as 
Athletic Director of Arizona State University (2012–2013),  
 
Patterson worked for more than two decades in professional 
sports as an executive with the NFL’s Houston Texans, the 
NBA’s Houston Rockets and Portland Trail Blazers, as well as 
the Houston Aeros hockey team. He also served as president of 
Pro Sports Consulting.  
 
As President of the Portland Trail Blazers, The Rose Garden 
and Rose City Radio from 2003-07, Patterson was responsible 
for all business and basketball operations for the team and 
arena, as well as local media outlets. Patterson engineered a 
record six draft-day trades that resulted in the selection of NBA 
Rookie of the Year and three time NBA All-Star Brandon Roy 
and fellow All-Rookie First Team, NBA All-Star, and  
All-NBA member LaMarcus Aldridge, a former Longhorn 
standout.  
 
From 1997-2003, Patterson served as the Senior Vice President 
and Chief Development Officer of the Houston Texans NFL 
franchise where he led Bob McNair’s successful effort to  
                                                          
27. Employment Agreement with James Hackett, Univ. of Mich. (Oct. 31, 2014); Settlement  
Agreement By and Between The University of Michigan and David A. Brandon, Univ. of Mich. (Oct. 
30, 2014). 
28. Employment Agreement with James Hackett, supra note 27. 
29. Settlement Agreement By and Between The University of Michigan and David A. Brandon, supra 
note 27, ¶ 2.  
30. Athletics Director Steve Patterson, TEX. LONGHORNS ATHLETICS, http://www.texass-
ports.com/sports/2013/11/5/GEN_1105131632.aspx?id=476 (last visited May 25, 2016). 
31. Id. 
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acquire a National Football League franchise and Super Bowl 
XXXVIII for Houston, Texas. Patterson was responsible for the 
establishment of the team’s business, legal, media and political 
operations, as well as the development, design, finance and 
construction of Reliant Stadium.   
 
Prior to joining the Texans, Patterson was the President,  
General Manager and Governor of the Houston Aeros hockey 
team. For his efforts there, he was named the 1995 winner of 
the Andy Mulligan Trophy as the International Hockey 
League’s Executive of the Year. In addition to his roles with 
the Aeros, Patterson also acquired and served as President and 
Partner in Arena Operating Company, which managed and  
operated Compaq Center, Houston’s home of the Rockets, 
Aeros and Comets.  
 
As General Manager of the Houston Rockets from 1989-93, he 
was the primary architect of the 1993-1994 Houston Rockets 
squad that captured the first NBA World Championship in  
franchise history, signing or trading for all the team’s players 
and coaches. Patterson also led the club’s successful bid to host 
the 1989 NBA All-Star Game, which held the all-time  
attendance record of 44,735 [fans] for 21 years.32 
 
 Despite Patterson’s impressive track record, there are several  
explanations for his termination on September 15, 2015.  Nearly all of  
Patterson’s long résumé, save for a twenty month tenure at Arizona State  
University, consisted of positions held in professional sports.  Similar to  
Brandon’s attempt to run the Michigan athletic department as a business,  
Patterson tried to change the unique collegiate athletics environment at Texas.  
“According to his critics, he turned longtime Longhorns fans, season-ticket 
holders and boosters into faceless customers, and fired or forced out many  
veteran athletic department employees, many of whom were proud Texas 
alumni.”33  This included Rick Barnes, Head Basketball Coach and a  
                                                          
32. Id. 
33. Mark Schlabach, The Steve Patterson Era at Texas: ‘He Just Put Us Through Hell,’ ESPN (Sept. 
18, 2015), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/13683231/the-steve-patterson-era-texas-just-
put-us-hell. 
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seventeen-year veteran of Texas, and Mack Brown, Head Football Coach and a 
sixteen-year veteran of Texas. Patterson deviated from the norm, including 
“rais[ing] ticket prices in men’s basketball and football, mov[ing] the stadium 
seats of faculty members and former lettermen,” charging fans to use prime  
tailgating spots around campus, and “eliminat[ing] complimentary meals in  
dining halls and other perks for coaches and athletic department employees.”34  
After the ticket price increase, about 10,000 football tickets were not renewed 
for the 2015 season.35   
 Patterson has also been criticized for not settling the lawsuit commenced 
by Oklahoma State University (Oklahoma State) against Joe Wickline for 
breach of contract and $600,000 in damages for making a lateral move to 
Texas.36  “Patterson has maintained from the beginning this was an issue  
between Wickline and Oklahoma State” and Texas was not a named party in the 
lawsuit.37  Wickline left Oklahoma State after the 2013 season to become the 
Co-offensive Coordinator at Texas.  Wickline’s contract with Oklahoma State 
stated that for him to leave the university before the end of his contract, he must 
either become an NFL coach or a college offensive coordinator with play calling 
duties.38  Oklahoma State Athletic Director Mike Holder and Football Coach 
Mike Gundy did not believe Wickline was calling plays for the Texas  
Longhorns, thus making a lateral move in going to Texas, and filed suit for 
damages under the contract with Wickline.39  Mike Perrin, the new athletic  
director for Texas said Oklahoma State’s lawsuit against Wickline was a  
distraction and the same would be settled short of a trial.40  
University of Texas President Greg Fenves sums up the important role of 
the athletics department when he refers to it as “the front door to the  
university.”41  Football and basketball coaches are sometimes the faces of the 
                                                          
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Brian Davis, Oklahoma State, Wickline Trial Likely to Start After Football Season, 
MYSTATESMAN (July 24, 2015), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/sports/college-football/okla-
homa-state-joe-wickline-likely-to-start-trial-/nm6FW/.  
37. Id. 
38. Tom Fornelli, Texas Off. Coordinator Wickline Files Lawsuit Against Oklahoma State, CBS 
SPORTS (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-foot-
ball/24764494/texas-offensive-coordinator-files-a-lawsuit-against-oklahoma-state.  
39. Davis, supra note 36.  
40. Ryan Autullo, Mike Perrin Calls Joe Wickline Lawsuit ‘a Distraction,’ HOOKEM (Oct. 3, 2015), 
http://www.hookem.com/2015/10/03/mike-perrin-calls-joe-wickline-lawsuit-a-distraction/. 
41. Jori Epstein, If Texas Athletics Is the Front Door of the University, Steve Patterson Is the Door-
man, DAILY TEXAN (July 20, 2015), http://www.dailytexanonline.com/2015/07/20/if-texas-athletics-
is-the-front-door-of-the-university-steve-patterson-is-the-doorman (emphasis added). 
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athletic department and even the university, but Patterson treated them like  
secondary employees.42 
The athletic director of today performs many roles other than just managing 
the athletic department. Patterson did not take on some of the additional roles 
such as “schmoozing fans to haul in donations,” and it was unclear to multiple 
athletic officials what Patterson’s primary responsibility actually was.43  One 
crucial athletic director attribute that Patterson struggled with was his colleague 
relationships.  Fenves once commented that Patterson was “impersonal or even 
arrogant.”44  Patterson also neglected his head football coach by refusing to  
increase salaries for his analysts; “[s]ix of the eight analysts left for other 
jobs.”45  “In Texas . . . [y]ou’ve got to know how to communicate to good ol’ 
boys . . . .”46  Fans were upset enough that they even flew a banner over  
Royal-Texas Memorial Stadium that read “Patterson Must Go.”47 
In the wake of Patterson’s termination, he will receive a hearty percentage 
of the remaining compensation on his contract.48  After serving as the men’s 
athletic director at Texas for less than two years, Patterson still had about $4 
million left on his contract ($1.4 million annually).49  “[T]he University of 
Texas Board of Regents approved a settlement with Patterson that will,  
according to reports, pay Patterson up to two full years’ salary, depending on 
his compensation at his next gig.  At least $1.4 million of the settlement is  
guaranteed.”50 
 The athletic director of today must have an intricate understanding of the 
culture of intercollegiate athletics as understood by other university personnel 
other than the athletic department, a culture that has been suggested to be a 
highly organized commercial enterprise with a powerhouse mentality that  
favors entertainment over education and utilizes a corporate model, rather than 
an educational model.  A culture where the primary focus may be athletics,  
rather than academics, escalates expenditures in the chase for the dollar which 
ultimately results in the diversion of academic dollars to the sports fields.  The 
                                                          
42. Schlabach, supra note 33. 
43. Epstein, supra note 41 (emphasis added). 
44. Schlabach, supra note 33.  
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. See id. 
49. Stephen Young, UT Blows a Couple Million on Athletic Director It Never Should Have Hired, 
DALLAS OBSERVER (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/ut-blows-a-couple-million-
on-athletic-director-it-never-should-have-hired-7626658. 
50. Id. 
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athletic department has been characterized by interlocking relationships with 
private sector companies that result in numerous scandals in the world of  
amateur sports, and as an enterprise that is non-sustainable and will ultimately 
put an end to the primary and academic purpose of the university.  An athletic 
director needs specialized skills, not only business skills but also an astute  
understanding of the university environment, university rules and regulations, 
the inter-relationship between academics and athletes and must be a team player 
in understanding the academic environment.  In essence, it does not make any  
difference how much education, business experience, or bottom line success 
someone has in business, a person must also know and be able to work in and 
become part of a university system and understand the thinking of not only the 
administrators but also the academics, as it relates to the athletic enterprise.  
III. ATHLETIC DIRECTOR CONTRACTS – AN INTRODUCTION 
 Athletic director contracts are agreements that are institutionally  
produced, most likely, by university counsel.  They can be long, they can be 
sophisticated, they can contain all the legalese of a coach’s contract, and in most 
instances, closely resemble the contracts of coaches representing the university.  
Because, in most instances, the same counsel is drafting the contract for both 
the coach and the athletic director, the checklist elements in Author Greenberg’s 
article Checklist for Negotiating and Drafting of Coaches’ Employment  
Agreements is a useful tool to assist in negotiating an athletic director’s  
contract.51  Athletic director contracts are highlighted by a list of duties, a  
compensation package, and of course, termination provisions. 
 As previously noted, the athletic director of today is the CEO of the  
athletic enterprise.  An athletic director’s duties go way beyond simply  
managing a university’s athletic department: budget management, revenue  
generation, rules compliance, alumni and donor relations, fundraising, capital 
improvements, and hiring and firing coaches are just some of the increasing 
responsibilities that an athletic director now must undertake as part of the job.  
 There is no standard form athletic director contract, just like there is no 
standard form for coaches’ contracts.  This is dissimilar from professional sports 
leagues, where standard contracts for all players are mutually negotiated  
between the union and management pursuant to some form of collective  
bargaining or basic agreement.  There are no unions representing athletic  
directors, although they have formed the National Association of Collegiate  
                                                          
51. See Martin J. Greenberg, Checklist for Negotiating and Drafting of Coaches’ Employment 
Agreements, THE LAW OFF. OF MARTIN J. GREENBERG (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.greenberglawof-
fice.com/checklist-negotiating-drafting-coaches-employment-agreements/.  
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Directors of Athletics (NACDA), a professional organization that “provid[es] 
educational opportunities and serves as a vehicle for networking and the  
exchange of information to others in the profession.”52 
 Because athletic director contracts are a sophisticated legal endeavor, 
consultation with a competent attorney who is familiar with the elements of  
athletic director contracts, familiar with the culture and negotiation of university 
contracts, and has adept negotiation skills would be most helpful to produce the 
best contract product.  
A. General Duties of an Athletic Director 
 A good example of a listing of athletic director duties and responsibilities 
was found in the contract of former University of Texas Athletic Director  
Stephen Patterson. Patterson’s Employment Agreement with Texas recites the 
following duties and responsibilities: 
 
A. Recognition of Duties.  Subject to the other provisions of 
this Agreement, the Athletics Director shall devote his best 
efforts full-time to leadership, supervision, and promotion 
of the Program. Athletics Director will report directly to, 
and act and perform to the reasonable satisfaction of the 
President of The University of Texas at Austin, who will 
determine Athletics Director’s duties and responsibilities. 
 
B. General Duties and Responsibilities.  In his position as  
Athletics Director, he is responsible for the duties normally 
associated with an athletics director at a Division I  
university including: maintaining a high level of  
leadership, having a strong commitment to the University’s 
expectations for an athletics program run with integrity, 
student-athlete academic success and progress to  
graduation, high athletic achievement, financial solvency, 
student-athlete conduct and welfare, compliance with the 
Governing Athletic Rules and University Rules, personnel 
supervision and evaluation, scheduling assistance,  
promotions, public relations, development activities, and 
the overall effective performance of the Program’s  
                                                          
52. What Is NACDA and What Does It Do?, NACDA, http://www.nacda.com/nacda/nacda-over-
view.html (last visited May 25, 2016).  
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student-athletes and coaching staff.  
 
C. Specific Duties and Responsibilities.  Duties and  
responsibilities assigned to the Athletics Director in  
connection with the Program are set forth below.  The list 
of specific duties and responsibilities supplements, and is 
not exclusive of, other general duties and responsibilities 
provided for elsewhere in this Agreement.  The specific  
responsibilities of the position include, but are not limited 
to, the following:  
 
(1) Be responsible for, along with University’s Women’s 
Athletics Director, creating, enforcing, interpreting, 
and reviewing University’s intercollegiate athletics 
policies, procedures, and strategic plan; 
 
(2) Assure that the Program has plans, policies,  
procedures, and programs that comply with the  
Governing Athletics Rules and University Rules, and 
that promote the mission of the University, the  
University’s high standard of academic excellence, and 
the general welfare of student-athletes; 
 
(3) Understand, observe, and uphold all academic  
standards and requirements of the University,  
including the University Rules, Governing Athletic 
Rules, and all state and federal laws, and ensure  
compliance by coaches and other personnel in the  
Program; 
 
(4) Use his best efforts to ensure that all academic  
standards, requirements, University Rules, and  
Governing Athletic Rules are observed, including 
those in connection with recruiting and eligibility of 
prospective and current student-athletes who are  
academically qualified; 
 
(5) Develop procedures and programs that assure the  
welfare of student-athletes; ensure that coaching and 
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administrative staff actively support the Program’s and 
the University’s joint commitment to academic 
achievement for each student-athlete, to include  
promoting academic advising and counseling services; 
maintain an environment in which the pursuit of higher 
education is a priority as reflected by class attendance, 
grade point averages, the NCAA academic progress 
rates (APR), and the NCAA and federal graduation 
rates; 
 
(6) Promote athletic excellence and a competitive program 
for men’s intercollegiate varsity sports programs; 
 
(7) Be responsible for the recruitment, hiring, and the 
terms and conditions of employment of all men’s head 
coaches, with consultation and approval by the  
President; 
 
(8) Maintain responsibility for the supervision and conduct 
of the head coaches and their activities; this  
responsibility shall include, without limitation,  
providing annul evaluations of such head coaches; 
 
(9) Maintain responsibility for hiring and supervising all 
administrative and other personnel as deemed  
appropriate for the proper and effective functioning of 
the Program; 
 
(10)Maintain effective working relationships with relevant 
constituencies, including associations, conferences, 
committees, alumni, students, faculty, administrators, 
and staff; 
 
(11)Ensure the fiscal integrity of the Program; develop 
plans and budgets; raise private funds; and, monitor the 
expenditure of all funds in the Program consistent with 
all state and federal laws, University Rules, and  
Governing Athletic Rules; 
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(12)Identify needs for capital construction, renovation and 
repairs; negotiate and recommend appropriate  
broadcast, sports marketing, apparel, shoe, and other 
sponsorship arrangements, etc.; 
 
(13)Consult regularly with athletics compliance staff  
regarding the interpretation of applicable rules, and 
bring any differences of opinion to the President for 
resolution; assist the athletics compliance staff or other 
designated individuals in reviewing and/or  
investigating alleged violations of a University Rule or 
Governing Athletic Rule; 
 
(14)Promote the University’s commitment to equal  
opportunity and compliance with Title IX; 
 
(15)Maintain responsibility for overseeing all aspects of 
the administration of the varsity sports in the Program; 
and 
 
(16)Perform such other duties as assigned by the President.  
 
D. NCAA and Other Governing Athletic Rules and University 
Rules. 
 
(1) Athletics Director agrees to know, recognize, and  
comply in all respects with NCAA and other  
Governing Athletic Rules and University Rules.  In the 
performance of his duties and obligations under this 
Agreement, Athletics Director will abide by and  
comply with all Governing Athletic Rules and  
University Rules and all decisions of the President.  
Violations of any Governing Athletic Rules or  
University Rules by Athletics Director will be  
sufficient cause for disciplinary action. 
 
(2) It shall be the responsibility of Athletics Director to 
promote an atmosphere of compliance within the  
Program and to monitor the activities regarding  
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compliance of all coaches and other administrators  
involved with the Program who report directly or  
indirectly to Athletics Director.  If, at any time during 
the Term of this Agreement, Athletics Director knows, 
or has reasonable cause to believe, that any coach,  
student-athlete, student, faculty member, or agent or 
employee of the University, or any outside individual 
has violated, or allowed or caused to be violated, any 
Governing Athletic Rules or University Rules, or if 
Athletics Director receives notice or information that 
the NCAA or the Conference intends to investigate or 
to review any alleged violations of Governing Athletic 
Rules or University Rules, or if Athletics Director  
receives notice or information that any law is alleged 
to have been violated by any student-athlete, coach,  
administrator, or staff member, including himself, he 
must immediately report such information, knowledge, 
or belief to the athletics compliance staff and to the 
President as appropriate. 
 
(3) If Athletics Director is found to be in violation of  
Governing Athletic Rules, whether while employed by 
the University or during prior employment at another 
NCAA member institution, Athletics Director shall be 
subject to disciplinary or corrective action as set forth 
in the provisions of the NCAA enforcement  
procedures, including suspension without pay, or the 
employment of Athletics Director may be terminated 
as provided in Section 7.A of this Agreement.53 
 
 By way of comparison, what follows is a position summary outlining the 
duties and responsibilities for the position of athletic director posted by the 
 University of Louisville: 
 
 
 
                                                          
53. Athletics Director Employment Agreement with Stephen Patterson, ¶  4, Univ. of Tex. at Austin 
(Nov. 25, 2013), http://projects.statesman.com/documents/?doc=2161183-steve-patterson-contract.  
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I. Position Summary 
 
The Vice President for Athletics reports directly to the 
President.  This position is the responsible officer for the 
University of Louisville Athletic Association., and serves 
as athletic director.  The VP for Athletics is authorized to 
act for the ULAA, in carrying out the functions according 
to the terms and conditions of the Management Agreement 
and Agency Agreement between the University and the 
ULAA.  The Vice President shall advise the president on 
all matters relating to the university’s strategic objectives 
in the areas of intercollegiate athletics.  
 
 II. Individual Responsibilities  
 
1. Integrate the Athletic Department and University into a 
more cohesive environment and improve communication 
and maximize public perception.  
 
2. Ensure a total emphasis and focus on improving  
graduation rates and academic success of the  
student-athletes.  
 
3. Recommend an annual budget for approval by the 
ULAA board[.]   
 
4. Manage the operational, financial and personnel  
activities of Intercollegiate Athletics[.]  
 
5. Make arrangements for all intercollegiate contests  
including game contracts, facilities contracts and all usual 
and customary duties ordinarily undertaken by the home 
team[.]  
 
6. Contract for all services for Intercollegiate Athletics 
through normal University of Louisville business  
procedures[.]  
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7. Recommend to the ULAA Board of Directors new  
policies and programs for Intercollegiate Athletics[.] 
  
8. Evaluate existing athletic facilities and recommend  
improvements as needed[.] 
  
9. Advance UofL’s commitment to gender equity under  
Title IX—particularly through fundraising and planning.  
 
10. Promote student, faculty, staff and public interest in  
Intercollegiate Athletics[.] 
  
11. Build upon successful marketing relationships to  
promote the marketing, licensing, and merchandising  
associated with UofL sports[.] 
  
12. Raise endowments and other private financial support 
for Intercollegiate Athletics pursuant to the policies of 
ULAA[.] 
  
13. Maintain current knowledge of NCAA and applicable 
conference regulations and promote “zero tolerance” for 
infractions through education and enforcement[.]  
 
14. Assure effective communications with FAR and all 
Board committees[.]   
 
15. Make recommendations to the Board of Directors of 
ULAA with respect to appointment and retention of all  
associate athletic directors and conduct annual  
performance evaluations thereof[.]  
 
16. Make recommendations to the Personnel Committee of 
the Board of Directors with respect to employment of all 
full-time head coaches and to conduct annual performance 
evaluations of said coaches taking action to adjust salary, 
renew contract, or terminate employment, provided that 
any compensation arrangements for coaches which require 
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action of the Board of Directors for safe harbor treatment 
under IRS intermediate sanctions regulations shall be  
referred to the full Board for prior approval[.] 
  
17. Interview, select and evaluate the performance of all 
assistant athletic directors, part-time head coaches, and 
support staff[.]  
 
18. Review and approve or disapprove the selection,  
retention and evaluation of all assistant coaches by the head 
coach of the sport[.]  
 
19. Ensure that the operation of the unit fulfills the  
academic mission of the University.54 
 
 In conclusion, and based upon a review of numerous athletic director 
contracts, athletic director duties and responsibilities encompass some or all of 
the following: 
 
1.Budget and fiscal management of the athletic department; 
2.Revenue generation; 
3.Arrange for athletic contests; 
4.Contract for services; 
5.Rules compliance; 
6.Hire and fire head collegiate coaches; 
7.Representing the athletic department to external constituents; 
8.Fundraising; 
9.Alumni relations; and 
10.Capital projects. 
B. Term of Athletic Director Contracts 
Colleges and universities are making long term commitments to individuals 
they choose as their athletic directors.  The standard term in the industry today 
                                                          
54. VICE PRESIDENT FOR ATHLETICS POSITION DESCRIPTION, LOUISVILLE ATHLETICS (n.d.), 
http://louisville.edu/athletics/vpathjobdescription.pdf.  
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is somewhere in the area of a five-year initial term.  What follows are some 
examples of contract terms in various athletic director contracts:  
 
Athletic Director University Original Term Length 
(years) 
Barry Alvarez University of Wisconsin Feb. 2006 – Jan. 2011 (5)55 
Shawn M. Eichorst University of Nebraska Jan. 2013 – Dec. 2017 (5)56 
Kevin Anderson University of Maryland Oct. 2010 – Sept. 2015 (5)57 
Michael J. Thomas University of Illinois Aug. 2011 – Aug. 2016 (5)58 
Oliver Luck West Virginia  
University 
June 2010 – June 2015 (5)59 
Mark Coyle Boise State University Jan. 2012 – Dec. 2016 (5)60 
Pedro A. Garcia Florida International 
University 
Oct. 2011 – Oct. 2016 (5)61 
C. Jeffrey Compher East Carolina University Apr. 2013 – Apr. 2018 (5)62 
Heather Lyke Eastern Michigan  
University 
July 2013 – July 2018 (5)63 
                                                          
55. Employment Agreement Between Division of Intercollegiate Athletics University of Wisconsin-
Madison and Barry Alvarez (Athletic Director), ¶ II(A), Univ. of Wis.-Madison (Feb. 1, 2006). 
56. Contract of Employment Director of Athletics Department of Intercollegiate Athletics University 
of Nebraska-Lincoln with Shawn M. Eichorst, § 1, Univ. of Neb.-Lincoln (Jan. 1, 2013). 
57. University of Maryland Athletic Director Agreement with Kevin Anderson, ¶ 2, Univ. of Md. 
(Oct. 1, 2010). 
58. Employment Agreement with Michael J. Thomas, ¶ 3, Univ. of Ill. (Aug. 29, 2011). 
59. Employment Agreement with Oliver Luck, W. Va. Univ. (June 30, 2010). 
60. Employment Agreement with Mark Coyle, art. 2.1, Boise State Univ. (Dec. 1, 2011). 
61. Florida International University Employment Contract with Pedro A. Garcia, ¶ I(k), Fla. Int’l 
Univ. (Oct. 16, 2011). 
62. Employment Agreement Director of Athletics with C. Jeffrey Compher, ¶ I, A., E. Carolina Univ. 
(Apr. 30, 2013). 
63. Eastern Michigan University Vice President/Athletic Director Employment Agreement with 
Heather Lyke, ¶ 2.1, E. Mich. Univ. (June 28, 2013). 
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Michael O’Brien University of Toledo July 2007 – July 2010 (3)64 
Thomas Wistrcill University of Akron Sept. 2009 – Sept. 2014 (5)65 
Jeremy N. Foley University of Florida Feb. 1997 – Jan. 2002 (5)66 
Joseph L. Alleva Louisiana State  
University 
July 2008 – June 2013 (5)67 
William R. Battle III University of Alabama Mar. 2013 – June 2017 (4)68 
Donald Ray Tanner Jr. University of South  
Carolina 
Aug. 2012 – June 2017 (5)69 
Michael A. Bobinski Georgia Tech University Apr. 2013 – June 2018 (5)70 
Julie K. Hermann Rutgers University June 2013 – June 2018 (5)71 
Stephen Patterson University of Texas at 
Austin 
Nov. 2013 – Aug. 2019 (6)72 
Mike Holder Oklahoma State  
University 
July 2011 – June 2016 (5)73 
Joseph R. Castiglione University of Oklahoma July 2011 – June 2017 (6)74 
Michael F. Alden University of Missouri July 2009 – June 2019 (10)75 
                                                          
64. Employment Contract with Michael O’Brien, Univ. of Toledo (July 27, 2007). 
65. Employment Agreement with Thomas Wistrcill, ¶ 4.1, Univ. of Akron (Sept. 9, 2010). 
66. University of Florida Employment Contract Athletic Director with Jeremy N. Foley, ¶ 4(A), 
Univ. of Fla. (Feb. 1, 1997).   
67. Employment Agreement with Joseph L. Alleva, ¶ 3, La. State Univ. (Apr. 28, 2008). 
68. Employment Contract with William R. Battle, III, art. III, Univ. of Ala. (Mar. 21, 2013). 
69. Employment Agreement with Donald Ray Tanner, Jr., ¶ 3.01, Univ. of S.C. (Aug. 2, 2012). 
70. Employment Contract with Michael A. Bobinski, art I, Ga. Tech Athletic Ass’n (Apr. 1, 2013). 
71. Employment Contract with Julie K. Hermann, ¶ I, State Univ. of N.J. (June 16, 2013). 
72. Athletics Director Employment Agreement with Stephen Patterson, supra note 53, ¶ 3. 
73. Employment Contract with Mike Holder, ¶ 1, Okla. State Univ. (July 1, 2011). 
74. Employment Agreement with Joseph R. Castiglione, ¶ 3, Univ. of Okla. (July 1, 2011). 
75. Restated Contract for Employment with Michael F. Alden, ¶ 1, Univ. of Mo. (Aug. 28, 2012). 
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Stan Wilcox Florida State University Aug. 2013 – Aug. 2018 (5)76 
Raymond Anderson Arizona State University Feb. 2014 – Feb. 2019 (5)77 
David Heeke Central Michigan  
University 
Nov. 2013 – Dec. 2017 (4)78 
Daniel J. Schumacher Chicago State  
University 
June 2012 – June 2016 (4)79 
Daniel Radakovich, Jr. Clemson University Dec. 2012 – June 2018 (5.5)80 
Josiah C. Hull, Jr. College of Charleston Jan. 2008 – Dec. 2012 (5)81 
Mark Sandy Eastern Kentucky  
University 
July 2005 – June 2009 (4)82 
William Chaves, Jr. Eastern Washington 
University 
July 2013 – June 2018 (5)83 
Cheryl Levick Georgia State University Mar. 2009 – June 2014 (5)84 
Jeffrey K. Tingey Idaho State University July 2011 – June 2014 (3)85 
Ronald Prettyman Indiana State University Mar. 2011 – June 2016 (5)86 
                                                          
76. 2013 Employment Agreement with Stan Wilcox, ¶ II(A), Fla. State Univ. (Aug. 20, 2013). 
77. Multiple-Year Vice President for University Athletics Contract with Raymond Anderson, ¶ 1, 
Ariz. State Univ. (Feb. 5, 2014). 
78. Central Michigan University Associate Vice President/Athletic Director Employment Agree-
ment with David Heeke, ¶ 3.0, Cent. Mich. Univ. (Nov. 21, 2013). 
79. Executive Employment Agreement with Daniel J. Schumacher, ¶ 2.1, Chi. State Univ. (June 10, 
2012). 
80. Employment Agreement with Daniel Radakovich, Jr., ¶ 4.1, Clemson Univ. (Dec. 1, 2012). 
81. Employment Contract with Josiah C. Hull, Jr., ¶ 2.1, Coll. of Charleston (Jan. 1, 2008). 
82. Employment Agreement with Mark Sandy, ¶ 3.1, E. Ky. Univ. (May 30, 2005). 
83. Administrative Employment Contract Eastern Washington University Director of Intercolle-
giate Athletics with William Chaves, Jr., ¶ II, E. Wash. Univ. (July 1, 2013). 
84. Georgia State University Athletic Association, Inc. Director of Athletics Agreement with Cheryl 
L. Levick, ¶ 1, Ga. State Univ. (Mar. 30, 2009). 
85. Employment Agreement with Jeffrey K. Tingey, art. 2.1, Idaho State Univ. (July 1, 2011). 
86. Indiana State University Employment Contract for Director of Intercollegiate Athletics with 
Ronald Prettyman, ¶ 2.0, Ind. State Univ. (Mar. 11, 2011). 
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John Currie Kansas State University July 2010 – June 2016 (6)87 
Robert De Carolis  Oregon State University July 2011 – June 2016 (5)88 
Morgan J. Burke Purdue University July 2010 – June 2017 (7)89 
Eric C. Hyman Texas A&M University Aug. 2012 – July 2017 (5)90 
David A. Brandon University of Michigan Mar. 2010 – Mar. 2015 (5)91 
Lawrence “Bubba” 
Cunningham 
University of North  
Carolina – Chapel Hill 
Nov. 2011 – June 2017 (5.5)92 
Eugene D. Smith Ohio State University Apr. 2005 – Apr. 2012 (7)93 
Mitchell Barnhart University of Kentucky July 2007 – June 2012 (5)94 
Sheahon Zenger University of Kansas Feb. 2011 – June 2015 (4)95 
Gregory Byrne University of Arizona July 2014 – May 2019 (5)96 
Richard L. George University of Colorado Sept. 2013 – Aug. 2018 (5)97 
Warde Manuel University of  
Connecticut 
Mar. 2012 – June 2017 (5)98 
                                                          
87. Employment Agreement with John Currie, ¶ 1, Kan. State Univ. (July 1, 2010). 
88. Employment Agreement and Notice of Appointment Director, Oregon State University Depart-
ment of Intercollegiate Athletics with Robert De Carolis, ¶ 1, Or. State Univ. (July 1, 2011). 
89. Director of Intercollegiate Athletics Employment Agreement with Morgan J. Burke, ¶ I, Purdue 
Univ. (July 1, 2010). 
90. Employment Agreement with Eric C. Hyman, ¶ 1, Tex. A&M Univ. (Aug. 1, 2012). 
91. University of Michigan Athletic Director Employment Agreement with David A. Brandon, ¶ 2, 
Univ. of Mich. (Mar. 8, 2010). 
92. Employment Agreement with Lawrence (Bubba) Cunningham, ¶ 1, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill 
(Nov. 14, 2011). 
93. Employment Agreement with Eugene D. Smith, ¶ 2.1, Ohio State Univ. (Apr. 15, 2005). 
94. Employment Agreement with Mitchell Barnhart, ¶ 1, Univ. of Ky. (July 1, 2007). 
95. Employment Agreement with Sheahon Zenger, ¶ 1, Univ. of Kan. (Jan. 1, 2011). 
96. Multiple-Year Employment Contract for Vice President for Athletics and Director of Athletics 
with Gregory Byrne, ¶ 1, Univ. of Ariz. (July 15, 2014).  
97. Employment Agreement Between Richard L. George and the Regents of the University of Colo-
rado, ¶ 1(a), Univ. of Colo. (Aug. 23, 2013).  
98. University of Connecticut Director of Athletics Agreement with Warde Manuel, ¶ 2, Univ. of 
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Anne “Sandy” Barbour Pennsylvania State  
University 
Aug. 2014 – Aug. 2019 (5)99 
 
C. Athletic Directors’ Compensation 
 The best study done to date with respect to athletic directors’  
compensation was undertaken by USA Today in an article posted on March 6, 
2013, entitled Athletic Director Salary Database.100 
 The compensation packages will greatly differ for athletic directors  
employed by Division I Football Bowl Subdivision FBS Power 5 conferences, 
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision FBS Non-Power 5 conferences, and  
Division I Champion (FCS Non-football playing schools).  Although the study 
reports compensation packages for 2013, the range of compensation is  
indicative of the difference in pay based on the status of the university and the 
conference in which the university participates.101  What follows are the top 
twenty-five paid NCAA athletic directors pursuant to the 2013 USA Today 
study:102 
 
RK SCHOOL CONF ATHLETICS DIRECTORS SCHOOL PAY 
1 Vanderbilt SEC David Williams $3,239,678  
2 Louisville Big East Tom Jurich $1,401,915  
3 Florida SEC Jeremy Foley $1,233,250  
4 Wisconsin Big Ten Barry Alvarez $1,143,500  
5 Nebraska Big Ten Shawn Eichorst $1,123,000  
6 Texas Big 12 DeLoss Dodds $1,107,391  
7 Ohio State Big Ten Gene Smith $1,099,030  
                                                          
Conn. (Mar. 19, 2012). 
99. Director of Intercollegiate Athletics Appointment Terms with Anne “Sandy” Barbour, Univ. of 
Penn State (July 26, 2014).  
100. Jodi Upton & Steve Berkowitz, Athletic Director Salary Database, USA TODAY (Mar. 6, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/03/06/athletic-director-salary-database-
methodology/1968783/.  In an email received on October 23, 2015, from Steve Berkowitz, USA Today 
Sports Projects Reporter, he indicated that USA Today would be revisiting the Athletic Director Salary 
Database during the summer or fall of 2016 if USA Today decides to go ahead with a revised study.  
101. See id. 
102. See id.  
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8 Notre Dame Big East Jack Swarbrick $1,026,942  
9 Oklahoma Big 12 Joe Castiglione $1,000,000  
10 Duke ACC Kevin White $906,536  
11 Arkansas SEC Jeff Long $900,000  
12 Michigan Big Ten Dave Brandon $900,000  
13 Iowa State Big 12 Jamie Pollard $900,000  
14 Tennessee SEC Dave Hart Jr. $817,250  
15 Texas A&M SEC Eric Hyman $800,000  
16 LSU SEC Joe Alleva $725,000  
17 Clemson ACC Dan Radakovich $725,000  
18 UCLA PAC-12 Dan Guerrero $715,211  
19 Michigan State Big Ten Mark Hollis $700,000  
20 Texas Christian Mt. West Chris Del Conte $695,769  
21 Wake Forest ACC Ron Wellman $688,000  
22 South Carolina SEC Ray Tanner $675,000  
23 Missouri SEC Mike Alden $651,917  
24 Kentucky SEC Mitch Barnhart $650,000  
25 Navy Patriot Chet Gladchuk $637,897  
 
By way of comparison, what follows are the compensation packages for 
athletic directors listed as the 50th through 69th highest paid athletic directors 
in the 2013 USA Today study:103 
 
50 South Florida Big East Doug Woolard $479,657  
51 Iowa Big Ten Gary Barta $487,842  
52 Purdue Big Ten Morgan Burke $464,437  
53 Washington State PAC-12 Bill Moos $455,000  
                                                          
103. See id. 
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54 Connecticut Big East Warde Manuel $450,000  
55 Utah PAC-12 Chris Hill $450,000  
56 Kansas Big 12 Sheahon Zenger $450,000  
57 Mississippi State SEC Scott Stricklin $182,000  
58 Florida International Sun Belt Pete Garcia $441,832  
59 Indiana Big Ten Fred Glass $430,746  
60 New Mexico Mt. West Paul Krebs $408,391  
61 Rutgers Big East Tim Pernetti $410,000  
62 Memphis CUSA Tom Bowen $400,000  
63 Mississippi SEC Ross Bjork $400,000  
64 Penn State Big Ten David Joyner $396,000  
65 Central Florida CUSA Todd Stansbury $375,000  
66 Arizona State PAC-12 Stephen Patterson $365,000  
67 Cincinnati Big East Whit Babcock $364,000  
68 East Carolina CUSA Terry Holland $361,400  
69 Utah State WAC Scott Barnes $350,108  
 
 Finally, what follows are the compensation packages for athletic directors 
listed as numbers 90th through 113th highest paid athletic directors in the 2013 
USA Today study: 104 
 
90 New Mexico State WAC McKinley Boston $239,128  
91 Wyoming Mt. West Tom Burman $236,004  
92 Florida Atlantic Sun Belt Patrick Chun $235,000  
                                                          
104.  See id. 
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93 Akron MAC Tom Wistrcill $229,500  
94 Army Patriot Boo Corrigan $233,500  
95 Texas State WAC Larry Teis $225,000  
96 Miami (Ohio) MAC David Sayler $220,000  
97 Central Michigan MAC Dave Heeke $219,838  
98 Texas-San Antonio WAC Lynn Hickey $215,000  
99 
Middle Tennessee 
State 
Sun Belt Chris Massaro $210,215  
100 Troy Sun Belt John Hartwell $210,000  
101 Toledo MAC Mike O'Brien $208,855  
102 Massachusetts A-10 John McCutcheon $207,442  
103 Eastern Michigan MAC Derrick Gragg $200,011  
104 Southern Mississippi CUSA Jeff Hammond $200,000  
105 South Alabama Sun Belt Joel Erdmann $197,825  
106 Arkansas State Sun Belt Terry Mohajir $190,000  
107 Idaho WAC Rob Spear $189,866  
108 Western Kentucky Sun Belt Todd Stewart $186,012  
109 Bowling Green MAC Greg Christopher $185,402  
110 Western Michigan MAC Kathy Beauregard $171,458  
111 Air Force Mt. West Hans Mueh $165,300  
112 Louisiana-Lafayette Sun Belt Scott Farmer $150,000  
113 Louisiana-Monroe Sun Belt Bobby Staub $109,923  
 
 Not surprisingly, the median salary for athletic directors at universities that 
are part of what are referred to as the BCS schools (i.e., members of the ACC, 
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Big Ten, Big East, SEC, Big 12, and Pac 12) is more than two and a half times 
larger than their non-BCS counterparts.105  In fact, the highest paid non-BCS 
athletic director still earns less than the average salary among BCS athletic  
directors according to the 2013 USA Today study.106 
D. Bonuses 
Much like college coaches’ contracts, athletic director contracts are  
designed to encourage and incentivize achievement.  In reviewing numerous  
athletic director contracts, bonuses are awarded for 
 
 Academics: 
o Graduation rate  
o Number of students on honor roll 
o Grade Point Average (GPA)  
o GPA compared against the conference  
o GPA increase from previous year  
o Percentage of scholar athletes  
o Academic Progress Rate (APR) 
 Athletics: 
o Percent of coach’s incentives  
o Winning division  
o Winning conference  
o Achievement of top seed in conference tournament  
o Participation in conference championship  
o Achievement of conference championship game  
o Appearance in postseason  
o Advancement in postseason  
o Appearance in title game  
o Winning title game  
o Directors’ cup ranking  
o Win percentage  
 Financial: 
o Revenue increase over previous year  
                                                          
105. See id. 
106. See id. 
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o Fiscal management  
o Club membership growth  
o Amount of contributions to the program  
o Meeting fund raising objectives  
 Longevity and Retention 
 Signing bonuses  
 Overall performance bonus 
 Compliance bonus  
 Attendance bonus  
 Project completion  
 
 What follows are some examples of the bonus clauses itemized above: 
 
1. Academic 
University of Louisville – Thomas M. Jurich 
 
(d)The following bonus based on the graduation rate of the 
 University student athletes which shall be non-cumulative: 
i. $12,000 for any year in which the 6-year graduation rate 
for University student athletes is equal to or greater than 
60%, or  
ii. $24,000 for any year in which the 6-year graduation rate 
for University student athletes is equal to or greater than 
65%, or  
iii. $36,000 for any year in which the 6-year graduation rate 
for University student athletes is equal to or greater than 
70%, or  
iv. $48,000 for any year in which the 6-year graduation rate 
for University student athletes is equal to or greater than 
75%.  
(e)$20,000 for the Employer’s being a member of among the 
Big East public universities, with the highest average GPA for 
the academic year for all student athletes in conference sports 
or for the Employer’s being the member among the Big East 
public universities with the highest GPA for the academic year 
for all student athletes in Division I-A football playing Big East 
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member schools; 
(f)$15,000 for an Institutional Student Athlete average GPA of 
3.0 for all University student athletes and conference sports;  
(g)$1,000 per team GPA of 3.0 for student-athletes for an  
academic year; 
(h)An annual bonus in an amount equal to one hundred sixty 
percent (160%) of the annual premium to be paid on the  
insurance policy described in Section 4.7.107  
 
University of Arizona – Gregory Byrne 
 
A. Academic Performance 
Director may receive additional compensation following  
completion of a particular Academic Year for promoting  
academic success by the University’s student-athletes as  
measured by the following Student-Athlete Graduation Success 
Rate (“SAGSR”) and Student-Athlete Cumulative Grade Point 
Average (“SACGPA”) achievements, as defined and calculated 
by University or NCAA rules.  “Academic Year” shall mean 
each respective twelve consecutive-month period beginning 
each August on the first day of classes at the University. 
SAGSR and SACGPA payments are for the highest ranked 
achievement in each category and are not cumulative in either 
category unless otherwise specified: 
 
1.SAGSR 
 
Director will receive the Additional Compensation  
specified below if the SAGSR exceeds the General  
University Graduation Success Rate (GUGSR) as follows 
(no rounding off): 
 
SAGSR exceeds GUGSR by 5%: 1 week of Base Salary 
 
SAGSR exceeds GUGSR by 10%: 2 weeks of Base Salary 
                                                          
107. Employment Contract with Thomas M. Jurich, ¶ 3.2(d)–(g), Univ. of Louisville (Oct. 1, 2007).  
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SAGSR exceeds GUGSR by 15%: 3 weeks of Base Salary 
 
SAGSR exceeds GUGSR by 20%:  4 weeks of Base Salary 
 
2.SACGPA (cumulative) 
 
Director will receive the Additional Compensation  
specified below if the SACGPA for male and female  
student-athletes exceeds the CGPA of comparable  
non-student-athletes enrolled in the University: 
 
Male SACGPA exceeds the general              
University male CGPA  
(no rounding off):                           2 weeks of Base Salary 
and 
 
Female SACGPA exceeds the  
University female CGPA 
(no rounding off):                           2 weeks of Base Salary  
 
If none of the SAGSR or SACGPA achievements set forth 
above are satisfied in a given Academic Year, no amount 
will be paid to Director for such year.  In no event shall  
Director receive more than eight weeks of Base Salary in 
any given Academic Year for the academic performance 
achievements listed above.  Additional compensation  
under this Section accrues and is payable only if Director 
was employed by the University as Director for the entire  
Academic Year in which the academic achievements were 
accomplished.108  
 
 
 
                                                          
108. Multiple-Year Employment Contract for Vice President for Athletics and Director of Athletics 
with Gregory Byrne, supra note 96, ¶ III(A).  
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University of Colorado – Richard L. George 
 
5. Incentive Salary for Meeting Performance Goals.  In  
addition to his Base Salary and Supplemental Salary, George 
may earn incentive compensation for meeting performance 
goals (“Incentive Salary for Performance”) as set forth below.  
George may earn Incentive Salary for Performance for reaching 
a goal only if he has met or exceeded the goal on or before the 
end of the period specified for meeting the goal.  
 
(a) Academic Goals: In each Contract Year, George may 
earn Incentive Salary for Performance as follows: 
 
(i) Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) for each UCB 
varsity team that scores an academic progress 
rate (“APR”), as defined in NCAA legislation, 
of One Thousand (1000) for the current  
academic year as of the end of the UCB Spring 
Semester of the Contract Year. 
(ii) Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) if the  
average grade point average for all varsity  
student athletes equals or exceeds the average 
grade point average for all UCB undergraduate 
students.  The average grade point averages 
shall be determined by the UCB Registrar as 
of the end of the UCB Spring Semester of the 
Contract Year.109  
2. Athletic 
University of Alabama – William R. Battle, III  
  
“Wins BCS National Championship                       $50,000  
 
Wins SEC Championship Game                             $40,000  
 
                                                          
109. Employment Agreement Between Richard L. George and the Regents of the University of  
Colorado, supra note 97, ¶ 5(a).  
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Wins SEC West Championship and  
participates in SEC Championship Game               $20,000”110 
 
Texas A&M University – Eric C Hyman 
 
(a)Football 
 
Win National Championship                                   $100,000;  
 
Appearance in a [sic] NCAA sanctioned  
post-season bowl other than the Cotton Bowl,  
Chick-fil-A Bowl, Capital One Bowl, or the 
Outback Bowl (inclusive of any successors  
thereto that is not a Bowl Championship  
Series (“BCS”) Bowl game                                    $30,000;  
 
Appearance in the Cotton Bowl,  
Chick-fil-A Bowl, Capital One Bowl,  
or the Outback Bowl (inclusive of any  
successors thereto)                                                 $60,000; 
 
Appearance in Conference  
Championship Game                                             $60,000; 
  
Appearance in BCS Bowl (or replacement  
such as a Playoff Bowl Game) or  
Championship Bowl (SEC v. Big 12)                   $90,000.  
 
(b)Men’s Basketball 
 
CONFERENCE Regular Season or  
                                                          
110. Employment Contract with William R. Battle, III, supra note 68, art.  4.05(a)(1)(i). 
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Tournament Champion                                          $25,000; 
  
Appearance NCAA Tournament                           $25,000; 
  
Appearance Sweet Sixteen                                    $50,000;  
 
Appearance Final Four                                          $75,000;  
 
National Champion                                                $100,000.  
 
(c)Women’s Basketball 
 
CONFERENCE Regular Season or  
Tournament Champion                                         $25,000;  
 
Appearance NCAA Tournament                          $25,000;  
 
Appearance Sweet Sixteen                                    $50,000;  
 
Appearance Final Four                                         $75,000; 
  
National Champion                                               $100,000. 
  
(d)Other NCAA or CONFERENCE Sports 
 
CONFERENCE Regular Season or  
Tournament Champion                                         $10,000;  
 
Team National Champion                                     $25,000; 
 
Appearance NCAA Post Season  
Competition or any individual  
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National Champion                                               $5,000.111 
 
3. Financial Success 
University of Illinois – Michael J. Thomas  
 
Fundraising/Public Relations  
 10% increase over previous  
years I-Fund annual gifts (annual  
fund, endowment, capital, other)              $20,000  
 25% increase over previous  
years I-fund annual gifts                        $32,500  
 $50M or greater in pledges/gifts  
for Assembly Hall project                        $25,000  
 50-75 public speaking engagements        $10,000 
 More than 75 public speaking  
engagements                                            $10,000 
 Excluding press-conferences and pre-game  
appearances at campuses of University sponsored 
receptions. 
 
A multimedia clause will be added to this section for FY  
2012-2013. 
 
Maximum cumulative payment  
for Fundraising/Public Relations                          $60,000112 
 
University of Maryland – Kevin Anderson 
 
7.4 Beginning with the Year July 1, 2010 - June 30, 2011, a 
payment of Seven ThousandFive Hundred Dollars ($7,500) at 
the end of each Year the Terrapin Club membershipshas  
                                                          
111. Employment Agreement with Eric C. Hyman, supra note 90, ¶ 4.03(a)–(d).  
112. Employment Agreement with Michael J. Thomas, supra note 58, Ex. A. 
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exceeded the previous year’s total by five percent (5%). 
 
7.5 Beginning with the Year July 1, 2010 - 2011, a payment of 
Seven Thousand FiveHundred Dollars ($7,500) at the end of 
each Year that the total contributions made for thebenefit of 
the Intercollegiate Athletic Program (including donations to the 
University of Maryland, the University of Maryland College 
Park Foundation, the University of Maryland Educational 
Foundation, and the Terrapin Club) exceeds by five percent 
(5%) the total of such contributions made in the prior Year.  
The sum of contributions for the Year will be governed by 
CASE accounting standards as interpreted by the University of 
Maryland College Park Foundation.113  
 
University of Colorado – Richard L. George 
 
5. Incentive Salary for Meeting Performance Goals. In  
addition to his Base Salary and Supplemental Salary, George 
may earn incentive compensation for meeting performance 
goals (“Incentive Salary for Performance”) as set forth below.  
George may earn Incentive Salary for Performance for reaching 
a goal only if he has met or exceeded to goal on or before the 
end of the period specified for meeting the goal.  
. . . . 
(b) Fundraising Goals:  George may earn Incentive Salary for 
Performance for meeting fundraising goals as follows.   
“Fundraising” as used in this section means gifts and donations 
designated or earmarked for the Athletics Departments (as  
determined by the UCB Vice Chancellor for Advancement) and 
booked after the effective date of this Agreement and before the 
end of each specified period. 
 
(i) Incentive Salary for Performance of Fifty  
Thousand Dollars ($50,000) for Fundraising as  
total of Fifteen Million Dollars ($15,000,000) on 
                                                          
113. University of Maryland Athletic Director Agreement with Kevin Anderson, supra note 57, ¶¶ 
7.4–7.5.  
GREENBERG_EVRARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/26/2016  4:50 PM 
2016]             ATHLETIC DIRECTORS  773 
or before June 30, 2014. 
(ii) Incentive Salary for Performance of One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000) for Fundraising a  
total of Twenty-five Million Dollars ($25,000,000) 
on or before June 30, 2015. 
(iii) Incentive Salary for Performance of One Hundred 
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000) for Fundraising 
a total of Fifty Million Dollars ($50,000,000) on or 
before June 30, 2016. 
(iv) Incentive Salary for Performance of Two Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($200,000) for Fundraising a 
total of Seventy-five Million Dollars 
($75,000,000) on or before June 30, 2017. 
(v) Incentive Salary for Performance of Two Hundred 
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) for Fundraising 
a total of One Hundred Million Dollars 
($100,000,000) on or before June 30, 2018. 
 
(c) License and Sponsorship Revenue Goals:  George may earn 
Incentive Salary for Performance for Generating Licensing and 
Sponsorship Revenue as follows.  For purposes of this section 
“Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue” means net revenue  
received by UCB from licensing of University trademarks and 
sponsorships, including, but not limited to, net revenue  
received from the Collegiate Licensing Company[,] the Nike 
Sponsorship Agreement, and Learfield Sports (or the successor 
or assign of any of them) as of June 30th of each Contract Year. 
“Fiscal Year 2013” means the State of Colorado fiscal year 
which began July 1, 2012 and ended June 30, 2013. 
 
(i) Incentive Salary for Performance of Fifty  
Thousand Dollars ($50,000) for generating  
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in the first 
Contract Year of at least 1.5 times the amount of 
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in Fiscal Year 
2013. 
(ii) Incentive Salary for Performance of One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000) for generating  
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in the second 
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Contract Year of at least 2 times the amount of  
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in Fiscal Year 
2013. 
(iii) Incentive Salary for Performance of One Hundred 
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000) for generating 
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in the third 
Contract Year of at least 3 times the amount of  
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in Fiscal Year 
2013. 
(iv) Incentive Salary for Performance of Two Hundred 
Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($200,000) [sic] for 
generating Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in 
the fourth Contract Year of at least 4 times the 
amount of Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in 
Fiscal Year 2013. 
(v) Incentive Salary for Performance of Two Hundred 
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) for generating 
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in the fifth 
Contract Year of at least 5 times the amount of  
Licensing and Sponsorship Revenue in Fiscal Year 
2013. 
 
(d) Attendance Goals:  In each Contract Year, George may earn 
Incentive Salary for Performance in connection with  
Attendance at games as follows.  For purposes of this section, 
“Attendance” means the paid game attendance, which includes 
students, as determined by the UCB Athletics Department 
Ticketing Office. 
 
(i) Incentive Salary for Performance of Fifty  
Thousand Dollars ($50,000) if the average  
Attendance at Folsom Stadium for regular season 
football games for the Contract Year is at least 
Fifty Thousand (50,000) individuals. 
(ii) Incentive Salary for Performance of Fifty  
Thousand Dollars ($50,000) if the average  
Attendance at the Coors Event Center for regular 
season Men’s Basketball games for the Contract 
Year is at least Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty 
(10,750) individuals. 
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(iii) Incentive Salary for Performance of Fifty  
Thousand Dollars ($50,000) if the average  
Attendance at the Coors Event Center for regular 
season Women’s Basketball games for the  
Contract Year increases at least 10% over the  
previous Contract year. 
 
The parties agree that any payment under this paragraph 5 is 
expressly conditioned on George being employed as the  
Athletic Director on the date the performance goal is achieved.  
If, as of the date of the achievement of any performance goal, 
George has been suspended pending the outcome of an  
investigation by the University, the Conference, and/or the 
NCAA, compensation under this paragraph 5 for achievement 
of such goal shall not be due unless George is reinstated as the 
Athletic Director.  Incentive Salary for Performance under this 
section shall be payable in a lump sum on or before sixty (60) 
days after the achievement of the goal.114  
4. Longevity or Retention Bonus 
UCLA – Daniel G. Guerrero  
 
If Director completes the five full years of service contemplated 
under this contract, Director shall be paid a Retention Bonus of 
$750,000 payable at the end of the fifth year of the contract.  
None of this Retention Bonus shall vest or be payable if  
Director does not complete such five full years of service 
through March 31, 2013, except that if Director is terminated 
by the University without cause prior to March 31, 2013, or in 
the event of Director’s earlier death or a full disability that  
prevents Director from performing under this Agreement,  
Director or, in this case of Director’s death, Director’s heirs or 
estate shall be paid $150,000 for each year of service completed 
or pro-rated on a monthly basis for the actual number of months 
of any such year of service that has been completed.  The  
payment of this bonus or pro-rated bonus is to be made not later 
                                                          
114. Employment Agreement Between Richard L. George and the Regents of the University of  
Colorado, supra note 97, ¶ 5(b)–(c). 
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than April 30, 2013 or within 60 days of the death or a  
determination of full disability of Director if such death or  
disability should occur earlier than April 1, 2013.115 
 
Iowa State University – Jamie Pollard  
 
If Pollard is still employed by University on June 30, 2018,  
Pollard will receive a retention payment of $500,000, payable 
on June 31, 2018.  Said payment is forfeited by Pollard if  
Pollard voluntarily leaves employment with Iowa State  
University or is terminated with cause, as provided by Section 
IV, prior to June 30, 2018.  If Pollard is terminated by the  
University without cause prior to June 30, 2018, Pollard shall 
receive entire payment of $500,000 on July 31, 2018.116 
 
 
 
University of Purdue – Morgan J. Burke  
 
V. RETENTION BONUS 
  
To incent Burke to remain at Purdue in his role as Director until 
such time as he is slated to retire Purdue will pay Burke a  
Retention Bonus if Burke remains employed as Director by 
Purdue according to the following schedule: 
 
1. If Burke remains employed as Director through June 
30, 2012, Purdue will pay Burke a Retention Bonus of 
$100,000.00 on that date; 
 
2. If Burke remains employed as Director through June 
30, 2015, Purdue will pay Burke a Retention Bonus of 
$150,000.00 on that date; and 
                                                          
115. Employment Agreement UCLA Athletic Director with Daniel G. Guerrero, ¶ D(5), Univ. of 
Cal. L.A. (Apr. 1, 2008).  
116. Amended and Restated Employment Agreement with Jamie Pollard, ¶ V(2), Iowa State Univ. 
(Sept. 1, 2012).  
GREENBERG_EVRARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/26/2016  4:50 PM 
2016]             ATHLETIC DIRECTORS  777 
 
3. If Burke remains employed as Purdue’s Director 
through June 30, 2017, Purdue will pay Burke a  
Retention Bonus of $100,000.00 on that date.117 
 
Pennsylvania State University – Sandy Barbour 
 
“Retention Bonus                    $100,000 per contract year if AD      
                                                 remains employed as athletic  
                                                director on the last day of  
                                                such contract year.”118 
 
5. Signing or Extension Bonus 
Boise State University – Mark Coyle ($75,000) 
 
“In addition to the Base Salary, the University shall make a  
one-time payment to Athletic Director in the amount of 
$75,000 . . . .”119 
6. Compliance Bonus 
University of Iowa – Gary Barta ($15,000) 
 
“Exemplary compliance with NCAA, 
Big Ten and University Rules governing 
athletics operations                                                 $5,000.”120 
                                                          
117. Director of Intercollegiate Athletics Employment Agreement with Morgan J. Burke, supra note 
89, ¶ V.  
118. Director of Intercollegiate Athletics Appointment Terms with Anne “Sandy” Barbour, supra 
note 99. 
119. Employment Agreement with Mark Coyle, supra note 60, art. 3.1.6.  
120. The University of Iowa Amendment to Contract Director of Intercollegiate Athletics with Gary 
Barta, ¶ 4, b.(3), Univ. of Iowa (Nov. 18, 2013).  
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7. Attendance Bonus 
Florida International University – Pedro A. Garcia   
 
Attendance for Football Games: 
 
i. “Two percent (2%) of base salary for average regular 
season attendance between 15,000 and 15,499; or  
ii. Five percent (5%) of base salary for average regular 
season attendance between 15,500 and 15,999; or  
iii. Ten percent (10%) of base salary for average regular 
season attendance 16,000or [sic] above.” 
 
Attendance for Men’s Basketball Games:  
 
i. “Two percent (2%) of base salary for average regular 
season attendance between 1,000and [sic] 1,999; or  
ii. Five percent (5%) of base salary for average regular 
season attendance between 2,000and2,999 [sic]; or  
iii. Ten percent (10%) of base salary for average regular 
season attendance 3,000 or above.”121 
E. Perquisites 
Much like college coaches’ contracts, athletic directors are given benefits 
and perquisites that come with the job.  In summary, an athletic director’s  
benefits and perquisites entail 
 
 Automobile 
 Country Club Memberships 
 Tickets 
 Media/Promotions/Public Relations Compensation 
                                                          
121. Florida International University Employment Contract with Pedro A. Garcia, supra note 61, 
¶ IX(b)(i)(5)a–b. 
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 Leave/Sick/Vacation Days 
 Spouse and Family Travel 
 Private Aircraft 
 Moving Expenses 
 Apparel 
 Housing 
 Travel 
 Temporary Housing 
 Term Life Insurance 
 Supplemental Pay 
 Golf Privileges 
 Course Fee Courtesy (Tuition) 
 Medical Physical Examination 
 Appointment as Professor 
 Entertainment Reimbursement  
 Financial Planning Reimbursement  
 Expense Account 
 Telephone 
 
What follows are some examples of perquisites clauses in athletic directors’ 
contracts: 
1. Automobile 
University of Nebraska – Shawn M. Eichorst   
 
“A monthly allowance of the $800 per month in lieu of any 
benefit that might otherwise be included in this Contract related 
to the provision of an automobile for Mr. Eichorst’s personal 
use.”122   
 
 
 
                                                          
122. Contract of Employment Director of Athletics Department of Intercollegiate Athletics  
University of Nebraska-Lincoln with Shawn M. Eichorst, supra note 56, § 4(a)(1). 
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University of Utah – Chris Hill  
 
The University, at its sole expense, shall provide to HILL for 
his use during the Term of this Agreement an automobile that 
is mutually acceptable to the Parties for use by HILL.  The  
University shall pay for insurance for this automobile.  The  
University shall reimburse HILL for gasoline for expenses.  To 
obtain and retain this benefit, HILL must maintain a current and 
valid Utah driver’s license.123 
 
North Carolina State University – Deborah A. Yow 
 
D.NC STATE shall make arrangements for and provide one (1) 
courtesy or leased vehicle for the ATHLETICS DIRECTOR to 
use, contingent upon and while performing her duties under this 
Agreement.  NC STATE shall be responsible for maintaining 
collision and comprehensive liability insurance on the vehicle.  
Alternatively, NC STATE may provide an annual automobile 
allowance in the amount of $7,500.  ATHLETICS DIRECTOR 
shall be responsible for providing maintenance on any  
vehicle.124 
2. Country Club Memberships 
Ohio State University – Eugene D. Smith  
 
Ohio State shall  
 
[p]rovide to the Director, while the Director is employed as the 
Director of Athletics, a full family membership at a mutually 
agreed-upon local country club, a social family membership at 
a mutually agreed-upon local country club, and a full  
membership at the University Faculty Club; however, personal 
expenses associated with such country club memberships will 
                                                          
123. Employment Agreement with Chris Hill, ¶ 6(B), Univ. of Utah (July 1, 2011).  
124. Employment Agreement Director of Athletics with Deborah A. Yow, ¶ IV, D., N.C. State Univ. 
(July 15, 2010).  
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be paid by the Director.125   
 
Michigan State University – Mark Hollis  
 
The University will reimburse the Athletic Director for dues in 
one (1) country club selected by the Athletic Director (which 
does not engage in discriminatory practices in violation of  
applicable federal and state laws), which membership is  
required for the conduct of development activities and  
entertainment associated with the Athletic Director’s official 
responsibilities.126   
 
University of Kentucky – Mitchell Barnhart 
 
The University will continue to provide or make arrangements 
for membership and initiation fees, if any, at a mutually agreed 
upon golf or country club.  AD shall be responsible for payment 
of all expenses and costs associated with using the membership 
excluding monthly dues, which shall be paid by University.127 
3. Tickets 
University of Kansas – Sheahon Zenger 
 
g. Season Tickets.  Athletics Director shall receive six season 
tickets to men’s and women’s basketball games in Allen Field 
House and to home football games in Memorial Stadium.  Two 
tickets for each sport shall be for business use by Athletics  
Director in his capacity as Director of Intercollegiate Athletics, 
and four tickets for each sport shall be considered  
compensation to Athletics Director.  For the 2010–2011 men’s 
basketball season only, such tickets to men’s basketball games 
shall be limited to four tickets to games remaining at the time 
Athletics Director assumes duties, and shall consist of two  
                                                          
125. Employment Agreement with Eugene D. Smith, supra note 93, ¶ 3.8(c). 
126. Michigan State University Department of Intercollegiate Athletics Employment Agreement 
with Mark Hollis, § 4.2, Mich. State Univ. (June 1, 2012).  
127. Employment Agreement with Mitchell Barnhart, supra note 94, ¶ 6(d).  
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tickets for business use and two tickets for personal use. 
 
h. Scholarship Suite in Memorial Stadium.  Athletics Director 
shall have the use for business purposes only, consistent with 
IRS law and regulations, of a scholarship suite in the Kansas 
Memorial Football Stadium during home football games.  Such 
use must include a clearly established business purpose, and in 
any event at least 50 percent of attendees/occupants of the suite 
must be present for official business purposes.128  
 
Florida International University – Pedro A. Garcia  
 
Garcia shall receive, without charge, twenty (20) tickets to 
every home football and men’s and women’s basketball games, 
five (5) tickets to every football and men’s and women’s  
basketball away games, and ten (10) post season tickets to  
football and men’s and women’s basketball games for business 
use.  In addition, Garcia shall be entitled to official team  
transportation for up to five (5) people for away football 
games.129   
4. Housing Allowance 
University of Purdue – Morgan J. Burke  
 
“Effective July 1, 2010 and for the period that Burke is  
Director, Purdue will provide Burke with a housing allowance 
of $24,257.00, payable in 12 monthly installments.  The  
housing allowance shall be adjusted on an annual basis for cost 
of living as determined by the Consumer Price Index.”130   
 
 
 
                                                          
128. Employment Agreement with Sheahon Zenger, supra note 95, ¶ 3(j)—(k).  
129. Florida International University Employment Contract with Pedro A. Garcia, supra note 61, 
¶ IX, a. 
130. Director of Intercollegiate Athletics Employment Agreement with Morgan J. Burke, supra note 
89, ¶ IV(E).  
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Eastern Carolina University – Jeffrey Compher 
 
UNIVERSITY shall make temporary housing available for 
ATHLETICS DIRECTOR for a period of up to six months 
from the effective date of this Agreement.  At UNIVERSITY’S 
election and with reasonable notice to ATHLETICS 
DIRECTOR, UNIVERSITY may in its sole discretion, choose 
to pay ATHLETICS DIRECTOR a housing allowance not to 
exceed $1,500 per month instead of making housing directly 
available to him.131 
 
University of Connecticut – Warde Manuel 
 
3.4 Housing Advance.  Rather than provide for the accrual 
of deferred compensation by MANUEL for the period 
from the Effective Date through March 18, 2014 as 
contemplated by the parties in the Offer and Letter 
Agreement dated February 11, 2012, within thirty (30) 
days of the execution of this Agreement by the  
University and MANUEL, the University will pay to 
MANUEL the sum of Two Hundred Thousand and 
00/100 Dollars ($200,000) as an advance to assist 
MANUEL in connection with the acquisition of a  
personal residence in, or within a 50 mile vicinity of, 
Storrs, Connecticut (“Housing Advance”).  It is 
acknowledged by the University and MANUEL that 
the Housing Advance is being paid on the mutual  
expectation of MANUEL and the University that 
MANUEL will complete the Initial Term and,  
therefore, if MANUEL does not complete the Initial 
Term, MANUEL has agreed to repay all or a portion of 
the Housing Advance (and potentially additional 
amounts), subject to and in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of Section 10.132  
                                                          
131. Employment Agreement Director of Athletics with C. Jeffrey Compher, supra note 62, ¶ IV(C).  
132. University of Connecticut Director of Athletics Agreement with Warde Manuel, supra note 98, 
¶ 3.4.  
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5. Spouse and Family Travel 
Ohio State University – Eugene D. Smith 
 
Ohio State shall “[p]rovide for the travel costs of the Director’s 
spouse in attending away athletic contests.  In no event shall 
such travel costs exceed $5,000 in any contract year.”133 
 
University of Michigan – David Brandon (Terminated) 
 
For Bowl games, Men’s Basketball Final Four and other  
significant sports events, the University shall pay for or  
reimburse the Director for the reasonable travel expenses of his 
spouse.  Four other games and events, the University shall 
cover the travel expenses of the Director’s spouse if there is no 
significant incremental costs to the University.  If commercial 
carriers are used for travel not in the context of NCAA business 
travel or significant athletic events, the Director shall be  
responsible for his spouse’s travel expenses.  Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, the Director shall be responsible for all taxes on 
imputed income that he and/or his spouse may incur from travel 
described herein.134   
 
Texas A&M University – Eric C. Hyman 
 
It is understood by the parties that from time to time HYMAN’s 
spouse may be called upon to travel to and/or attend various 
functions on behalf of UNIVERSITY.  When engaged in such 
activities, HYMAN’s spouse shall be entitled to payment for 
travel and other expenses incurred in such official activities.135     
                                                          
133. Employment Agreement with Eugene D. Smith, supra note 93, ¶ 3.6(b).  
134. University of Michigan Athletic Director Employment Agreement with David A. Brandon,  
supra note 91, Ex. B, 4.  
135. Employment Agreement with Eric C. Hyman, supra note 90, ¶ 4.04.  
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6. Moving Expenses 
Eastern Carolina University – Jeffrey Compher 
 
“UNIVERSITY shall reimburse ATHLETICS DIRECTOR for 
documented personal moving expenses of up to $18,000  
reasonably incurred by ATHLETICS DIRECTOR within 
twelve months of the effective date of this Agreement, in  
accordance with standard procedures and applicable policies of 
the UNIVERSITY.”136 
 
Eastern Michigan University – Heather Lyke 
 
Upon submission of appropriate invoices, the University shall 
pay Employee’s moving company the standard costs associated 
with her moving from her current residence to the Ypsilanti, 
Michigan area.  University’s payment shall include packing and 
unpacking fees.  The moving company must be selected based 
on two competitive bids.  Preapproval from the University must 
be obtained before the moving company is hired.137   
 
Texas A&M University – Eric C. Hyman 
 
“HYMAN shall be reimbursed by UNIVERSITY up to an 
amount not to exceed $50,000, upon presentation of  
appropriate documentation and in accordance with 
UNIVERSITY policy and procedure, for reasonable and  
customary [out-of-pocket] expenses, including packing and  
unpacking charges, incurred by HYMAN in moving to College 
Station, Texas.”138 
                                                          
136. Employment Agreement Director of Athletics with C. Jeffrey Compher, supra note 62, ¶ IV(B). 
137. Eastern Michigan University Vice President/Athletic Director Employment Agreement with 
Heather Lyke, supra note 63, ¶ 3.1.20.  
138. Employment Agreement with Eric C. Hyman, supra note 90, ¶ 4.06. 
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7. Private Aircraft 
Ohio State University – Eugene D. Smith 
 
Ohio State agrees to fly the Director by private (not  
commercial) aircraft for business purposes only, not to exceed 
fifteen (15) hours each contract year during the term of the 
agreement.  Each hour the aircraft is contracted for such use, 
including but not limited to, empty “deadhead” legs of the 
flight, will count toward the fifteen (15) hours per year (except 
Ohio State shall only count the “deadhead” hours if Ohio State 
is charged for such “deadhead” hours).139   
 
University of Alabama – William R Battle, III 
 
As additional compensation to Employee, upon reasonable  
advance notice, the University shall furnish or otherwise make 
available to Employee a non-commercial airline airplane for 
Employees’ personal, non-business travel for a maximum of 
twenty-five (25) hours of flight time per Contract Year.  Flight 
time, for purposes of the 25 hour maximum, shall not include 
return trips without Employee, members of Employee’s family, 
or guests of Employee aboard the aircraft in conjunction with 
Employee’s use of the aircraft for personal, non-business 
travel.  Flight time not used in a Contract Year may not be  
carried over for use in the next Contract Year.140   
8.  Leave/Sick/Vacation Days 
University of California – Anne Barbour 
 
“Director shall be entitled to vacation leave as set forth in the 
Contract Addendum.  The leave shall be taken at a time or times 
approved by the Associate Chancellor - Chief of Staff and the 
Chancellor.”141   
                                                          
139. Employment Agreement with Eugene D. Smith, supra note 93, ¶ 3.7. 
140. Employment Contract with William R. Battle, III, supra note 68, art IV, § 4.05(j).  
141. Director Personnel Policies for Staff Members Employment Contract with Anne “Sandy” Bar-
bour, ¶ 5(b), Univ. of Cal. (Oct. 1, 2004).  
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Director shall be entitled to 20 working days of vacation leave 
at the beginning of each contract year of this Employment  
Contract.  Director’s accrued vacation balance may not exceed 
40 working days at any time during the period of this  
Employment Contract.  If Director’s accrued vacation balance 
reaches 40 working days, Director will not be entitled to accrue 
additional vacation leave under this provision until the leave 
balance is reduced below 40 working days.142   
 
“Director shall be entitled to sick leave for absences due to  
illness as set forth in the Contract Addendum.  In addition, the 
Associate Chancellor – Chief of Staff and the Chancellor may 
grant leave to Director with or without pay for other reasons, 
including illness.”143 
 
“Director shall be entitled to use up to 12 days of sick leave 
during each contract year of this Employment Contract.”144   
 
Louisville University – Thomas M. Jurich  
 
“The employee will receive one-month annual leave with pay 
and medical and administrative leave with pay on the same  
basis as other University administrators.”145   
9. Life Insurance 
University of Kentucky – Mitchell Barnhart 
 
“In addition to any amounts of life insurance provided through 
the University’s standard benefit package, University agrees to 
continue to provide AD with an additional term life insurance 
policy in the amount of One Million Dollars 
                                                          
142. Id. at Cont. Add. ¶ 3. 
143. Id. ¶ 5(c). 
144. Id. at Cont. Add. ¶ 4.  
145. Employment Contract with Thomas M. Jurich, supra note 107, ¶ 4.8.  
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($1,000,000.00).”146  
 
South Carolina University – Donald Ray Tanner, Jr.  
 
“During the term of this Employment Agreement, the  
University shall pay the premiums necessary to provide  
Employee with term life insurance benefits totaling Five  
Hundred Thousand ($500,000) Dollars.  Employee shall have 
the sole and exclusive right to designate any beneficiary.”147   
 
Georgia Technical University – Michael A. Bobinski 
 
“Bobinski shall be provided, at no charge, the PPO family  
medical insurance, dental and life insurance (up to three times 
the value of the annual salary amount up to a maximum of one 
million dollars) normally made available to employees of the 
Institute.”148  
 
University of Illinois – Michael Thomas 
 
“The University will reimburse Thomas on an annual basis for 
the premium cost of term life insurance with a death benefit of 
$1,000,000.00 upon presentation of billings for purchase of 
such insurance by Thomas, up to a maximum cost of $100.00 
per month ($1,200.00 per year).”149  
10. Miscellaneous 
a. Course fee courtesy (Tuition) 
 
Michigan State University – Mark Hollis  
 
“The Athletic Director shall be eligible for course fee courtesy 
                                                          
146. Employment Agreementwith Mitchell Barnhart, supra note 94, ¶ 6(e). 
147. Employment Agreement with Donald Ray Tanner, Jr., supra note 69, ¶ 4.04.  
148. Employment Contract with Michael A. Bobinski, supra note 70, art. IV(A).  
149. Employment Agreement with Michael J. Thomas, supra note 58, ¶ 4(h).  
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credit for the Athletic Director’s spouse and children, as  
described in and subject to the University’s Course Fee  
Courtesy Policy.”150   
b. Medical Physical Examination 
UCLA – Daniel G. Guerrero 
 
By exception to policy, Director shall be eligible for a  
comprehensive annual physical examination at a cost not to  
exceed $3,500 per year to be paid by department recharge from 
the Athletic Department to the UCLA School of Medicine’s 
Comprehensive Health Program.  Director’s participation in 
this physical is entirely voluntary, University shall observe all 
State and federal regulatory requirements concerning the  
protection of Director’s health information, and the results of 
such a physical shall not serve as a condition of employment.151 
c. Appointment as Professor 
University of Utah – Chris Hill  
 
Upon resignation as the Athletics Director or termination  
without cause, HILL shall be entitled to receive a tenure-track 
faculty appointment in the College of Health, or such other  
college as deemed appropriate by the  
President . . . . Compensation for HILL’s faculty position shall 
be commensurate with other similarly situated faculty members 
in the College of Health and shall be determined by the  
President in consultation with the Dean of the College of 
Health.  The faculty appointment will not be available to HILL 
in the event he is terminated by the University for cause.152    
                                                          
150. Michigan State University Department of Intercollegiate Athletics Employment Agreement 
with Mark Hollis, supra note 126, § 3.7. 
151. Employment Agreement UCLA Athletic Director with Daniel G. Guerrero, supra note 115, ¶ 
E(6).  
152. Employment Agreement with Chris Hill, supra note 123, ¶ 6(D).  
GREENBERG_EVRARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/26/2016  4:50 PM 
790 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 26:2 
 
d. Entertainment Reimbursement  
Michigan State University – Mark Hollis  
 
The University will reimburse the Athletic Director for  
personal and spousal travel and out-of-pocket expenses the 
Athletic Director reasonably incurs in the course of the  
performance of duties under this Agreement.  Expenses of  
entertaining, including home entertaining as appropriate, may 
be reimbursed through discretionary and other Department 
funds.  Reimbursements shall be made only pursuant to  
University policies and procedures.153 
 
Louisville University – Thomas M. Jurich  
 
The Employee is encouraged and expected to incur reasonable 
and necessary business and entertainment expenses consistent 
with the responsibilities and duties of the Employees’ [sic]  
position.  All business related expenses shall be reimbursed  
according to customary practice consistent with normal  
business standards, the Association Travel and Expense Policy, 
and consistent with the responsibilities and duties of the  
Employee’s position.154    
e. Financial Planning Reimbursement  
Louisville University – Thomas M. Jurich  
 
“The Employer agrees to reimburse Employee for reasonable 
expenses associated with financial planning, not to exceed 
$15,000 per annum.”155  
                                                          
153. Michigan State University Department of Intercollegiate Athletics Employment Agreement 
with Mark Hollis, supra note 126, § 4.1. 
154. Employment Contract with Thomas M. Jurich, supra note 107, ¶ 5.3.  
155. Id.  ¶ 5.5. 
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f. Expense Account 
University of Florida – Jeremy Foley   
 
In addition to normal reimbursement for business travel  
pursuant to University regulations, Association agrees to  
provide as part of his compensation as Athletic Director, a  
personal expense account for Foley at the rate of $15,000.00 
per annum net of applicable Federal and State withholding 
taxes.156 
 
University of Alabama – William R Battle, III 
 
“The University shall arrange and provide for Employee 
through supporting foundation of the University an expense  
allowance in the amount of Twelve Thousand Dollars 
($12,000) annually.”157   
g. Telephone  
Louisiana State University – Joe Alleva  
 
Alleva will receive “[a]ppropriate mobile communications  
device and service.”158  
F.Termination 
 Athletic director contracts are similar to those of college coaches’  
contracts in that they provide for different formats of termination, including  
termination for cause, termination without cause, termination for death or  
disability, and termination by an athletic director.  For example purposes, the 
Authors have used Stephen Patterson’s employment agreement with the  
University of Texas at Austin, Julie Herman’s employment contract with  
Rutgers State University of New Jersey, and Shawn Eichorst’s employment 
contract with the University of Nebraska. 
                                                          
156. University of Florida Employment Contract Athletic Director with Jeremy N. Foley, supra note 
66, ¶ 11. 
157. Employment Contract with William R. Battle, III, supra note 68, art. 4.05(c).  
158. Employment Agreement with Joseph L. Alleva, supra note 67, ¶ 5(B).  
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1. Termination for Cause 
Stephen Patterson, University of Texas, November 25, 2013 (Terminated) 
 
A. Suspension or Termination by the University for Cause. 
The University shall have the right and option to either suspend 
Athletics Director for a period of time with or without pay or to 
terminate Athletics Director’s employment and this Agreement 
for cause prior to the termination date stated in Section 3 above.  
In the even this Agreement is terminated for cause, all  
obligations of the University to make further payment or  
provide any other consideration hereunder shall cease as of the 
date of termination.  In no case shall the University be liable to 
Athletics Director for the loss of any collateral business  
opportunities, or any benefits, perquisites, income, or  
consequential damages suffered by Athletics Director as a  
result of the University’s termination of his employment.  In  
addition to its normally understood meaning in employment 
contracts, the term “cause” shall include, without limitation, 
any of the following: 
 
(1) Failure or refusal by Athletics Director to perform any 
of the obligations, duties, or responsibilities outlined in 
Section 4 or any refusal or unwillingness to perform any of 
such obligations, duties, or responsibilities in good faith 
and to the best of Athletics Director’s abilities; or 
 
(2) A serious or major violation or a pattern of violations, 
whether intentional or negligent, by Athletics Director of 
any Governing Athletic Rules or University Rules, which 
violation may, in the sole judgment and discretion of the 
President, reflect adversely upon the University, or the  
Program; or 
 
(3) A serious or major violation or a pattern of violations 
of any Governing Athletic Rules or University Rules, 
whether intentional or negligent, or the allowing or  
condoning, whether directly or by negligent supervision, of 
any such violation or pattern of violations, by Athletics  
Director or any coaching staff or other person under  
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Athletics Director’s supervision and direction, including 
student-athletes in the Program, which violation was 
known (or reasonably should have been known) by  
Athletics Director in the course of his normal duties, and 
which may, in the sole judgment and discretion of the  
President, reflect adversely upon the University or the  
Program; or 
 
(4) Failure by Athletics Director to report immediately to 
the athletics compliance staff and, as appropriate, to the 
President or other responsible University officer, any  
alleged violations of the Governing Athletic Rules or  
University Rules by Athletics Director or by members of 
Athletics Director’s coaching staffs, student-athletes, or 
other persons under Athletics Director’s direct control or 
authority that become known to Athletics Director; or  
 
(5) Failure or refusal to provide information or documents 
in response to any reasonable requests or inquires by the 
NCAA, the Conference, or any other relevant governing 
body concerning or related to the supervision of the  
Program; or directing or otherwise instructing any coach, 
student-athlete, or any other individual to fail or to refuse 
to provide such information or documents; or 
 
(6) Any fraud or dishonesty by Athletics Director while 
performing the duties required by this Agreement,  
including, but not limited to, falsifying, altering, or  
otherwise fraudulently preparing any documents(s) or  
record(s) of, or required by the University, the NCAA, or 
the Conference pertaining to the Program, recruits, or  
student-athletes, transcripts, eligibility forms, compliance 
reports, expense reports, or any other document pertaining 
or related to any sanction of the Program; or 
 
(7) Any conduct, including acts or omissions, that misleads 
the University about any matters related to the Program, 
including matters related to any coaches or other staff 
members or any student-athletes; or 
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(8) Any prolonged absence from the performance of  
Athletics Director’s obligations, duties, and responsibilities 
under this Agreement without prior consent of the  
President; or 
 
(9) Engaging in, assisting, encouraging, or soliciting others 
to engage in bookmaking, illegal gambling, or betting of 
any type involving any intercollegiate or professional  
athletic contest; or 
 
(10) Possession, use, sale, or manufacture of any narcotics, 
drugs, or other controlled substances, steroids, or other 
chemicals in a manner that is prohibited by the University 
Rules or Governing Athletic Rules, or allowing,  
encouraging, or condoning the possession, use, sale, or 
manufacture of any narcotics, drugs, alcohol, controlled 
substances, steroids or other chemicals by any  
student-athlete in a manner that is prohibited by the  
University Rules or Governing Athletic Rules, or failure or 
refusal to fully participate and cooperate in the University’s 
implementation and enforcement of any narcotic, drug,  
alcohol, controlled substance, steroid, or other chemical 
testing program(s); or 
 
(11) Any conduct (a) that the President reasonably  
determines is unbecoming to the Athletics Director, or 
which reasonably brings into question the integrity of the 
Athletics Director, or that would render Athletics Director 
unfit to serve in the position of Athletics Director; or (b) 
resulting in a criminal charge being brought against  
Athletics Director involving a felony or any crime  
involving theft, dishonesty, or moral turpitude; or  
 
(12) Misconduct by associate or assistant athletics directors 
or other senior staff or by a coach or his or her staff of 
which the Athletics Director knew, had reason to know, or 
should have known through the exercise of reasonable  
diligence or which Athletics Director condoned, of such a 
nature, as reasonably determined in the discretion of the 
President, that brings serious discredit to or hams the  
GREENBERG_EVRARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/26/2016  4:50 PM 
2016]             ATHLETIC DIRECTORS  795 
reputation of the University or the Program; or  
 
(13) Any other cause adequate to sustain the termination of 
any regular administrative and professional employee of 
the University. 
 
The University shall have no obligation to use progressive  
discipline regarding Athletics Director’s misconduct. Any  
University decision to utilize progressive discipline shall not 
create any future obligation for the University to use  
progressive discipline.159  
 
Julie K. Hermann, Rutgers State University of New Jersey, June 17, 2013 
(Terminated) 
 
XII.Discipline and Termination for Cause   
 
A. If Hermann is found to have violated NCAA rules or  
regulations, whether while employed by Rutgers or prior to  
employment by Rutgers, or to have failed to report or failed to 
take all reasonable means to prevent or stop a violation of 
which she knew or knows or reasonably should have known, 
she shall be subject to disciplinary or corrective action,  
including termination of employment or suspension without 
pay for significant or repetitive violations.  
 
B. The University may terminate Hermann for cause, or impose 
other discipline for cause, for (i) material breach of this  
Employment Contract; (ii) neglect of duty; (iii) willful  
misconduct; (iv) act of moral turpitude; (v) disregard of duty to 
take all reasonable actions to ensure all staff under your  
supervision and student-athletes abide by Academic Integrity 
policy; (vi) conduct tending to bring shame or disgrace to the 
University, or otherwise detrimental to the University’s good 
name and reputation as a public institution of higher education 
respectful of individuals and the rule of law, as determined in 
                                                          
159. Athletics Director Employment Agreement with Stephen Patterson, supra note 53, ¶ 7(A).  
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good faith by the President; (vii) violation of University  
regulations, policies, procedures or directives not remedied  
after thirty (30) days written notice to Hermann; (viii) violation 
of your responsibilities related to the requirements and  
standards referenced in Section X above and to cooperate with 
any compliance effort or investigation; (ix) a criminal  
conviction; or (x) unapproved absence from duty, other than for 
a bona fide use of sick leave in accordance with University  
policy, without the consent of the President. 
 
C. Failure to impose disciplinary or corrective actions in any 
particular instance of breach or violation, or with respect to any 
particular conduct or incident, shall not act as a waiver of the 
University’s right to later discipline or correct Hermann in  
connection with any breach, violation, conduct or incident, 
whether the same or different in degree or type, nor shall any 
single or partial exercise of any right, power or privilege  
preclude any further or other exercise thereof.  
 
D. If the University terminates Hermann for cause, the  
University shall not be liable for payment of salary or benefits 
after the date of termination.160 
2. Termination Without Cause 
Julie K. Hermann, Rutgers State University of New Jersey, June 17, 2013 
(Terminated) 
 
XIII.Termination Without Cause 
 
The University may terminate Hermann without cause, as cause 
is defined in Section XII above, as it deems necessary, in the 
sole discretion and judgment of the University, to further the 
best interests of the University.  In such an event, the University 
shall continue to pay Hermann her full base salary and health 
and pension benefits, but no other amount or item, as of the date 
of termination until the expiration date of this Employment 
                                                          
160. Employment Contract with Julie K. Hermann, supra note 71, ¶ XII.  
GREENBERG_EVRARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/26/2016  4:50 PM 
2016]             ATHLETIC DIRECTORS  797 
Contract (including any extensions, if any) or the date on which 
Hermann secures other employment, whichever date shall first 
occur.  Hermann shall notify Rutgers promptly of her securing 
other employment. Hermann agrees to accept this payment of 
full base salary and health and pension benefits in full  
settlement of all claims and demands which may accrue to  
Hermann under this Employment Contract and Rutgers shall 
not be liable to Hermann for any other damage, loss or 
amount.161  
 
Shawn M. Eichorst, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, January 1, 2013 
 
Section 13. Termination of Employment for Reasons Other 
than for Cause; Liquidated Damages; Mitigation of Damages. 
 
(a) The position of Athletic Director is unique and requires  
special talents and skills. As such, it is the only position for 
which Mr. Eichorst is being employed, and the University shall 
not have the right to reassign Mr. Eichorst to any other position.  
The parties agree that the University shall, at any time, have the 
right to terminate Mr. Eichorst’s employment hereunder for 
reasons other than for cause upon giving Mr. Eichorst  
reasonable written or verbal notice of termination, as such  
reasonableness, may be determined by the University in its  
discretion and exercise of good faith.  Notwithstanding any 
Contract provision which might be interpreted to the contrary 
or unless otherwise specifically agreed to in writing, Mr.  
Eichorst’s employment relationship with the University as  
Athletic Director shall terminate effective upon delivery of the 
notice of termination or as otherwise set forth in the notice of 
termination, in the event of such termination, the parties further 
agree that the damages incurred by Mr. Eichorst would be  
uncertain and not susceptible to exact computation.   
Accordingly, it is understood and agreed that any and all claims 
which may arise in Mr. Eichorst’s favor against the University 
and its Board members, employees and agents by reason of 
such termination shall be strictly and solely limited to an 
                                                          
161. Id. ¶ XIII.  
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amount of liquidated damages to be determined by multiplying 
the number of full months remaining in the Term immediately 
prior to the termination (such period of time to be referred to 
herein as the “LD Term”) by the amount of $81,083.83.  Except 
as otherwise set forth in this section below with respect to  
mitigation, the liquidated damages shall be paid in equal 
monthly installments over the course of the LD Term.  In case 
of Mr. Eichorst’s death, the University’s obligations under this 
section 13 shall cease, effective on the last day of the month in 
which Mr. Eichorst dies.  The obligations of the University  
under this subsection shall survive termination of this Contract. 
 
(b) Mr. Eichorst herby acknowledges and agrees to accept the 
duty to mitigate the liquidated damages described in this  
section, as well as any other damages Mr. Eichorst may sustain 
upon termination of this Contract, whether such termination be 
one for cause or without cause.  More specifically, within a  
reasonably brief period following termination, Mr. Eichorst 
shall use his best efforts to seek and secure substantially  
comparable employment, including the customary and  
reasonable terms and conditions of compensation at the new 
employment, without structuring or timing compensation to 
avoid mitigation.  If Mr. Eichorst obtains other employment 
during the LD Term, and such employment guarantees Mr.  
Eichorst cash compensation of $973,000.00 or more, then the 
monthly payments described in this section at (a) above shall 
cease.  However, if Mr. Eichorst obtains such other  
employment and the guaranteed cash compensation for the  
employment is less than $973,000.00 per year, then all  
University obligations to Mr. Eichorst for payments under this 
section 13 shall cease upon payment of a lump sum to Mr.  
Eichorst from the University, or other party designated by the 
University,  
computed as follows: the present value of a stream of payments 
over the remaining LD Term in an amount equal to the  
difference between $81,083.33 and Mr. Eichorst’s monthly 
prorated amount of his annual gross cash salary at the new  
employment, discounted at the 3-year Treasury Constant  
Maturity Rate.  [For purposes of illustration, assume Mr.  
Eichorst secures employment following a termination without 
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cause.  Upon the commencement of his new employment,  
fifteen months remain in the LD Term. Mr. Eichorst’s new  
employment guarantees that he receives cash salary of 
$600,000.00 a year (a monthly prorated amount of $50,000.00.)  
The University’s obligations under this section would be  
fulfilled upon payment to Mr. Eichorst of a lump sum equal to 
the present value of a stream of fifteen monthly payments of 
$31,083.83 ($81,083.33 less $50,000.00), discounted at the rate 
stated above.] 
 
(c) The parties have, bargained for and agreed to the foregoing 
liquidated damages provisions, giving consideration to the fact 
that Mr. Eichorst will lose certain benefits, supplemental  
compensation or outside compensation related to employment 
as Athletic Director, which damages are extremely difficult to 
determine with certainty.  The parties agree that payment to Mr. 
Eichorst of the liquidated damages provided in subsections (a) 
and/or (b) of this section shall constitute adequate and  
reasonable compensation to Mr. Eichorst for the damages and 
injury suffered by Mr. Eichorst as a result of the termination of 
this Contract by University.  Upon payment of such liquidated 
damages to Mr. Eichorst, Mr. Eichorst does hereby waive and 
release the University, its Board members, administrators,  
employees and agents, from any and all claims of any nature 
whatsoever, which may arise by reason of such termination,  
including, but not limited to any benefits of employment or 
other income which may accrue to Mr. Eichorst by reason of 
Mr. Eichorst’s position as Athletic Director. 
 
(d) Should the University, based upon advice of legal counsel 
or for any other reason the University in its discretion deems is 
appropriate, determine that the payments, provided for in this 
section are to be paid from resources other than resources of the 
State of Nebraska, then the University promises that it will  
secure funds from non-public funds for the satisfaction of the 
obligation described in this section.162 
                                                          
162. Contract of Employment Director of Athletics Department of Intercollegiate Athletics  
University of Nebraska-Lincoln with Shawn M. Eichorst, supra note 56, § 13.  
GREENBERG_EVRARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/26/2016  4:50 PM 
800 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 26:2 
3. Termination for Death and Disability 
Stephen Patterson, University of Texas, November 25, 2013 (Terminated) 
 
D. Termination for Disability/Death.  If Athletics Director 
dies or becomes permanently disabled to the extent that, in the 
judgment of the President, Athletics Director cannot  
satisfactorily perform the duties of Athletics Director, this 
Agreement shall terminate and all obligations of the University 
to compensate Athletics Director pursuant to this Agreement 
shall cease as of the date of such death or disability.  The  
University shall be obligated to compensate Athletics Director 
or Athletics Director’s estate in accordance with this  
Agreement for services performed prior to the termination date 
and, Athletics Director or Athletics Director’s estate shall be 
entitled to those benefits, if any, that are payable under any  
University sponsored group employee insurance or benefit plan 
in which Athletics Director is or was enrolled.163  
 
Julie K. Hermann, Rutgers State University of New Jersey, June 17, 2013 
(Terminated) 
 
XIV. Termination upon Death or Disability 
 
This Employment Contract will terminate upon the death of 
Hermann or upon her total and permanent disability.  Total and 
permanent disability shall mean physical or mental incapacity 
of a nature which prevents Hermann, in the sole judgment of 
Rutgers, from performing her duties under this Employment 
Contract for a period of ninety (90) consecutive days.  In case 
of death or disability, as described above, death or disability 
benefits contained in benefit plans in which Hermann  
participates shall be paid to her personal representative or other 
designated beneficiaries, or to Hermann, as the case may be.164 
                                                          
163. Athletics Director Employment Agreement with Stephen Patterson, supra note 53, ¶ 7(D). 
164. Employment Contract with Julie K. Hermann, supra note 71, ¶ XIV. 
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4. Termination by an Athletic Director 
Julie K. Hermann, Rutgers State University of New Jersey, June 17, 2013 
(Terminated) 
 
XV. Termination by Hermann 
 
Hermann may terminate this Employment Contract by  
providing the University ninety (90) days advance written  
notice to the President.  In such event, Rutgers’ obligations  
under this Employment Contract shall terminate upon the  
effective date of termination.  Upon receipt of such notice from 
Hermann, Rutgers may, in its sole discretion, relieve Hermann 
of her duties as Director of Intercollegiate Athletics at any time 
after receiving such notice.  In such event, Rutgers may, in its 
reasonable discretion, which shall not be unreasonably  
exercised, treat such termination as for cause and shall not be 
liable for payment of salary or any benefits after the date it has 
relieved Hermann of her duties.165  
 
Shawn M. Eichorst, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, January 1, 2013 
 
Section 9. Discussion of Other Prospective Employment;  
Resignation. 
. . . 
(b) Except as more specifically described in this subsection (b), 
there shall be no penalty to Mr. Eichorst for resignation from 
employment pursuant to this Contract; provided however, in 
the event that Mr. Eichorst resigns for any reason other than 
pursuant to Section 9(c) prior to December 31, 2017 the parties 
further agree that the damages incurred by the University would 
be uncertain and not susceptible to exact computation.   
Accordingly, it is understood and agreed that any and all claims 
which may arise in the University’s favor against Mr. Eichorst 
as a result of his resignation shall be strictly and solely limited 
to liquidated damages in the following amounts which sum 
shall be paid by Mr. Eichorst, or on his behalf, to Athletics 
                                                          
165. Id. ¶ XV.  
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within sixty (60) days following the effective date of Mr.  
Eichorst’s resignation: 
 
Effective January 1                            Liquidated Damages 
2013                                                    $2,000,000 
2014                                                    $1,500,000 
2015                                                    $1,000,000 
2016                                                    $500,000 
2017                                                    None 
 
The parties have bargained for and agreed to the foregoing  
liquidated damages provision, giving consideration to the  
significant costs of conducting an employment search for an 
Athletic Director; the serious and substantial disruption to  
Athletics and the University; and the serious and substantial  
devotion of administrative resources in relation to a change of 
Athletics leadership; all these result in damages extremely  
difficult to determine with certainty.  The parties agree that  
payment to the University of the liquidated damages provided 
above shall constitute adequate and reasonable compensation 
to the University for the damages and injury suffered by  
University as a result of Mr. Eichorst’s departure. 
 
(c) The parties have bargained for and agreed that there shall 
be no liquidated damages under this section 9 in the event that 
prior to December 31, 2017 the current UNL Chancellor  
resigns or retires and Mr. Eichorst resigns within 90 days of 
such resignation or retirement.166  
IV. CHALLENGES MOVING FORWARD 
As the overseer of an athletic enterprise, an athletic director is responsible 
for upholding the best interests of a university’s athletic programs and its  
student-athletes.  This section discusses the challenges that athletic directors 
currently face and may face in the future, possible outcomes or consequences, 
                                                          
166. Contract of Employment Director of Athletics Department of Intercollegiate Athletics  
University of Nebraska-Lincoln with Shawn M. Eichorst, supra note 56, § 9(b)–(c). 
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and steps that other athletic directors have already taken to address certain  
issues.  In recent years, this balancing act has become more difficult as a result 
of uncertainty in the legal landscape of college athletics.  Athletic directors must 
prepare for multifaceted challenges in key areas of college athletics, such as 
amateurism, conference autonomy, budget management, and institutional  
control.  It is difficult to predict the consequences of ongoing legal battles and 
future legislation; thus, a successful athletic director must be flexible and  
adaptive and prepare for many possible outcomes.   
A. The Principle of Amateurism - Introduction 
The Principle of Amateurism states that  
 
[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, 
and their participation should be motivated [primarily] by  
education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be 
derived. Student participation in [intercollegiate] athletics is an 
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from  
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.167   
 
The athletic director of today must be familiar with, understand, and know 
how to apply rules and regulations to fulfill his or her duty of oversight and 
compliance.  These rules and regulations, such as amateurism, are what make 
college athletics unique.  From the viewpoint of an athletic director, amateurism 
is what separates the athletic program from the corporate boardroom.   
The concept of amateurism is constantly challenged.  Recent developments 
call into question the legal status of NCAA rules that seek to protect  
amateurism.  In O’Bannon v. NCAA, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that, although amateurism rules are likely procompetitive, the 
NCAA’s amateurism rules are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny.168  The court 
held that by applying the Rule of Reason, one proper alternative to NCAA  
compensation rules is to permit NCAA member universities to pay  
student-athletes up to the full cost of attendance.169   
Another challenge to the concept of amateurism was a decision made by the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Region 13 Director who found that 
                                                          
167. 2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 2.9 (2015) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL] (emphasis 
added). 
168. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). 
169. Id.  
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grant-in-aid scholarship football players at Northwestern University were  
employees under section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act’s broad  
definition of employee.170  However, this ruling was later overturned by the 
NLRB, stating that it lacked jurisdiction regarding Northwestern University’s 
grant-in-aid scholarship football players.171 Although the NLRB declined  
jurisdiction, it did not preclude itself from reconsidering the issue in the  
future.172  Thus, student-athlete amateurism reform is still possible in the labor 
arena.  Similarly, the court in O’Bannon allowed NCAA amateurism rules to be 
subject to antitrust scrutiny.173  The athletic director of today must anticipate 
these possible changes because they will affect the budget, revenues, expenses, 
and the relationship between student-athletes and the university.  Moreover, 
planning ahead is beneficial because not all reform in college athletics depends 
on prolonged litigation or judicial decisions as evidenced by those proactive 
universities that voted to allow athletic scholarships to cover the full cost of 
attendance.174 
1. Athletic Scholarships 
Before the approval of athletic scholarships up to the full cost of attendance, 
student-athletes were actually able to receive financial aid in excess of an  
athletic scholarship.  All student-athletes could receive athletic scholarships 
capped at the amount of “full ‘grant in aid.’”175  Full grant-in-aid consists of 
“tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related books.”176   
Student-athletes could then request to receive financial aid beyond the amount 
of full grant-in-aid by applying for additional funds through programs such as 
the NCAA’s Division I Student-Athlete Opportunity Fund and need-based  
federal Pell Grants.   
Now, universities are allowed to award athletic scholarships that cover the 
“full cost of attendance.”177  Full cost of attendance consists of all the items 
included in full “grant in aid plus ‘[non-required] books and supplies,  
                                                          
170. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, *8 (. 2015). 
171. Id. at *1. 
172. Id.  
173. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1053. 
174. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Autonomy Schools Adopt Cost of Attendance Scholarships, 
NCAA.ORG (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/autonomy-schools-
adopt-cost-attendance-scholarships. 
175. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054. 
176. Id. 
177.  Hosick, supra note 174. 
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transportation, and other expenses related to attendance at the institution.’”178 
As of January 2015, student-athletes are able to receive, but are not entitled 
to receive, the full cost of attendance as part of their athletic scholarships.179  
The difference between full grant-in-aid and full cost of attendance will be given 
to student-athletes in the form of a stipend.180  Although this is a great benefit 
to student-athletes, several burdens fall on athletic directors, their universities, 
and their budgets.   
One difficulty arising from paying the full cost of attendance for athletic 
scholarships is that athletic directors must find ways to obtain the additional 
amount of money needed to pay student-athletes, which can be difficult.  Within 
the Big 12 Conference, the additional full cost of attendance value per  
student-athlete ranges from $2,700 to $5,100 per year.181  The average gap 
across all FBS universities is about $3,500.182  The highest and lowest full cost 
of attendance values among the Power 5 Conferences are $6,018 and $1,400, 
respectively.183  Although this may not seem like much money compared to the 
millions of dollars in revenue generated by athletic programs, the total sum of 
money given to male and female student-athletes will noticeably drive up the 
cost of doing business for each university.  Only twenty FBS universities  
actually made a profit from their athletic programs in 2013.184 Athletic  
programs like the University of Texas might be able to afford to accommodate 
an additional $5,750 per student-athlete, totaling approximately $1.5 million.185  
Similarly, the Ohio State University Athletic Director Gene Smith already 
worked $1.65 million into his budget to cover the full cost of attendance  
scholarships.186  On the other hand, most athletic programs do not have the  
discretionary funds or the luxury to simply reallocate the budget.  At the  
                                                          
178. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054 n.3 (alteration in original) (emphasis added); see also NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 184, art. 15.02.2. 
179. Hosick, supra note 174. 
180. See generally John Charles Bradbury & Joshua Pitts, Full Cost of Attendance Scholarships and 
College Choice: Evidence from NCAA Football, KENNESAW STATE UNIV., 1 (2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2656409. 
181. Id. at 4. 
182. Id. at 5. 
183. Id. at 4. 
184. John Powers, Paying Stipends to College Athletes Remains a Divisive Issue, BOS. GLOBE (Sep. 
2, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/09/01/paying-stipends-college-athletes-remains-
divisive-issue/eQV4hEW5A0wbTfw3S1KgKO/story.html. 
185. Epstein, supra note 41. 
186. Todd Jones, College Athletics | Ohio State’s Gene Smith Sees ‘Watershed Moment,’ BUCKEYE 
XTRA SPORTS (May 31, 2015), http://buckeyextra.dispatch.com/content/stories/2015/05/31/smith-
sees-watershed-moment.html. 
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University of North Carolina, Athletic Director Bubba Cunningham has the 
challenge of generating approximately $1.8 million in additional funds to cover 
the full cost of attendance for all current student-athletes.187 
Another difficulty that athletic directors face is that not all universities can 
afford to pay the full cost of attendance to every student-athlete; however, they 
must do so to compete with other universities in the recruitment of potential 
student-athletes.188  Now, a new element, or luxury, that athletic directors must 
compete with is the full cost of attendance stipend.  The full cost of attendance 
value differs from campus to campus, creating an opportunity for universities to 
differentiate themselves in the eyes of recruits.189  North Carolina State  
University Athletic Director Debbie Yow stated that a competitive advantage 
could be gained when a recruit “counts up how much cash he could make by 
going to school A versus school B.”190  Universities with higher cost of  
attendance values can use it as an advantage.  James Franklin, head football 
coach at Penn State University, said that having one of the highest cost of  
attendance values in the country is now something he can use in recruiting.191  
Many other university athletic department officials suggest that full cost of  
attendance values are being used as a recruiting tool.192   
The NCAA requires that cost of attendance for student-athletes must be  
calculated “in accordance with the cost-of-attendance policies and procedures 
that are used for students in general.”193  Thus, cost of attendance is calculated 
differently by each university’s financial aid office using federal regulations.194  
The calculations are significant because they have an effect on all students, not 
just student-athletes.  Usually, universities are pressured to keep the cost of  
attendance amount low in an attempt to limit borrowing by its students and also 
                                                          
187. Andrew Carter, An Interview with UNC Athletic Director Bubba Cunningham on Changes in 
College Sports, the Reopening of an NCAA Investigation, Roy Williams Future and More, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/sports/college/football/arti-
cle9158777.html. 
188. Jay Drew, BYU Athletics Will Pay $4,500 for Cost of Attendance, Among Highest in Country, 
SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 3, 2015), http://www.sltrib.com/sports/2465529-155/byu-athletics-will-pay-
4500-for. 
189. Hosick, supra note 174. 
190. Eric Prisbell, What Is Full Cost of Attendance for NCAA Athletes?, USA TODAY (Aug. 17, 
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/08/17/ncaa-full-cost-of-attend-
ance/14200387/. 
191. Jake New, More Money . . . If You Can Play Ball, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 12, 2015), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/08/12/colleges-inflate-full-cost-attendance-numbers-in-
creasing-stipends-athletes. 
192. See Powers, supra note 184.  
193. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 167, art. 15.02.2.1. 
194. Id. art. 15.02.2. 
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to avoid deterring potential students as a result of high costs.195  However,  
athletic directors and coaches may now want to be involved in the  
decision-making to increase the full cost of attendance amount.  Changes in the 
full cost of attendance values of universities in the Power 5 Conferences should 
be observed over the next few years to determine if, and by how much,  
university financial aid departments adjust their numbers in the wake of the full 
cost of attendance era.  Failure to comply with financial aid regulations can  
result in financial liabilities, fines against a university, limitations on a  
university’s Title IV program participation, or even elimination of a university’s 
eligibility to participate in one or more of the Title IV programs.196  Simply 
because universities are now allowed to award student-athletes scholarships up 
to the full cost of attendance, does not mean that all universities will.  Athletic 
directors are faced with tough decisions if their universities cannot afford to 
award every student-athlete a scholarship up to the full cost of attendance.  For 
some athletic directors, equality comes into play.  Former Syracuse University 
Athletic Director Mark Coyle thinks that full cost of attendance scholarships 
should apply to all student-athletes because it is the “fair and right thing to 
do.”197  For athletic directors who cannot easily obtain funds from the operating 
budget or boosters, other means must be used to fund the new athletic  
scholarships.  One possibility is to cut costs by eliminating non-revenue  
producing sports.198   
Another difficult issue that athletic directors must balance if they pay full 
cost of attendance scholarships is compliance with Title IX.  Applied to college 
athletics, “Title IX requires that female and male student-athletes receive  
athletics scholarship dollars proportional to their participation . . . .”199  The 
dollar amount of full cost of attendance scholarships must be equal between 
male and female student-athletes.200  This is unlike Title IX’s equitable  
treatment and benefits requirements, which pertain to non-gender related  
differences such as the costs of different equipment used by male and female 
student-athletes (i.e., football helmets for male student-athletes will cost more 
                                                          
195. Drew, supra note 188.  
196. NAT’L ASS’N OF STUDENT FIN. AID ADMIN’S (NASFAA), POLICIES & PROCEDURES TOOLS: 
READING & INTERPRETING REGULATION & STATUTE 2 (2010), https://www.kctcs.edu/en/Fac-
ulty_and_Staff/~/media/B62359988720472ABE36AABDAF00A8D6.ashx.  
197. Prisbell, supra note 190.   
198. Powers, supra note 184. 
199. Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/inclu-
sion/title-ix-frequently-asked-questions#how (last visited May 25, 2016). 
200. Id.  
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than equal quality shin guards for female student-athletes).201 
When deciding how to distribute the new full cost of attendance  
scholarships, University of North Dakota’s (North Dakota) Deputy Director of 
Athletics Daniella Irle illustrates the process of balancing Title IX rules with 
competitive recruiting.202  To compete with Big Ten universities at recruiting 
men’s hockey players, North Dakota had to adopt the full cost of attendance 
scholarship.203  However, once adopted, Irle had to figure out how to allocate a 
proportional scholarship amount to female student-athletes.204  In doing so,  
athletic directors need to worry about only the dollar amount being equal  
between male and female student-athletes.205   
2. Profiting from Names, Images, and Likenesses of Student-Athletes 
Before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided O’Bannon, United States 
District Court Judge Claudia Wilken ruled that restraints on the amount of  
compensation that student-athletes can receive for playing sports and for the use 
of their names, images, and likenesses (NILs) are a violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.206  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that NCAA amateurism 
rules are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny and that universities should not be 
restricted from providing scholarships up to the full cost of attendance.207   
However, the Ninth Circuit did not require that student-athletes be paid for the 
use of their NILs.208  Instead, it explained that  
 
the district court identified two procompetitive purposes served 
by the NCAA’s current rules: “preserving the popularity of the 
NCAA’s product by promoting its current understanding of 
amateurism” and “integrating academics and athletics” . . . The 
question is whether the alternative of allowing students to be 
paid NIL compensation unrelated to their education expenses, 
is “virtually as effective” in preserving amateurism as not  
                                                          
201. Id. 
202. Stefanie Loh, Stipends, Title IX Debated at NCAA Forum, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 25, 
2015), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2015/apr/25/ncaa-inclusion-forum-cost-living-stipend-title-
IX/. 
203. Id.  
204. Id.  
205. Id.  
206. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2015). 
207. Id. at 1053. 
208. Id. at 1076. 
GREENBERG_EVRARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/26/2016  4:50 PM 
2016]             ATHLETIC DIRECTORS  809 
allowing compensation. 
 
We cannot agree that a rule permitting schools to pay students 
pure cash compensation and a rule forbidding them from  
paying NIL compensation are both equally effective in  
promoting amateurism and preserving consumer demand.209 
 
O’Bannon is a significant driver that lead to the creation of autonomy for 
the Power 5 Conferences and the approval to pay student-athletes the full cost 
of attendance.  As athletic directors calculate how they will allocate and market 
full cost of attendance to student-athletes, they also need to prepare for the  
possibility of having to pay student-athletes for their NILs.  Despite the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling, it is unlikely that the debate over student-athlete compensation 
for their NILs is finished.  Successful athletic directors should still have  
contingency plans in place for the possibility of student-athlete compensation 
beyond full cost of attendance in the future. 
3. Unionization 
On March 26, 2014, the NLRB Region 13 Director issued a decision that 
Northwestern University grant-in-aid scholarship football players are  
employees of Northwestern University.210  The Region 13 Director based his 
decision on an analysis of grant-in-aid scholarship football players and their  
relationships with Northwestern University under the common law definition of 
employee, which “is a person who performs services for another under a  
contract of hire, subject to the other’s control or right of control, and in return 
for payment.”211   
In the director’s analysis, the services that grant-in-aid scholarship football 
players performed were described simply as athletic services performed for 
Northwestern University.212  Some of the benefits that Northwestern University 
received were revenues from ticket sales and television contracts and other  
benefits such as a positive reputation, media exposure, and increased  
applicants.213  The compensation that grant-in-aid scholarship football players 
                                                          
209. Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 
1005 (N.D. Cal. 2014)) (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984); 
Cnty. Of Tuolumne, 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
210. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at *8 (2015). 
211. Id. at *19. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
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received were economic benefits in the form of a scholarship, which covered 
tuition, fees, room, board, and books.214  The controls that Northwestern  
University exerted over grant-in-aid scholarship football players were  
itineraries for training camp and away games, and the monitoring by coaches of 
adherence to NCAA and team rules.215 
Supporters of college athletes being considered employees include the  
College Athletes Players Association (CAPA) and the players unions of five 
major professional sports leagues (NBA, NFL, NHL, MLB, and MLS).216   
Positive aspects of college athlete unionization are that the members of a team 
may gain a sense of ownership and create a close bond with teammates.217  On 
the other hand, opponents of the NLRB Region 13 decision include the NCAA 
and six leaders in Congress.218  NCAA president Mark Emmert described the 
“effort to unionize players a ‘grossly inappropriate’ way [of resolving issues] in 
college sports.”219  There are many negative ways that unionization can impact 
college athletes.  One negative impact of unionization is that the bargained-for 
benefits college athletes receive will likely violate NCAA rules.220  The NCAA 
claimed that declaring college athletes employees will “[u]surp the  
responsibilities entrusted to our academic leaders to determine what priority 
and role athletics should play in the educational development of the college  
students placed in their care.”221  If true, employee status of college athletes may 
therefore usurp the responsibilities of athletic directors.  Some of the main  
responsibilities of athletic directors are to support and encourage the education 
of athletes and to uphold university and NCAA policies.   
On August 17, 2015, the NLRB dismissed the Region 13 Director’s  
decision.222  In the NLRB’s decision and review, it concluded that it should not 
assert jurisdiction over only the case involving Northwestern University  
                                                          
214. Id. 
215. Id. at *20–21. 
216. Jon Solomon, NCAA and Others File Briefs in Northwestern Football Union Effort, 
CBSSPORTS (July 3, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solo-
mon/24606865/ncaa-and-others-file-briefs-in-northwestern-football-union-effort. 
217. Todd Jones, College Athletics | Northwestern: ’Cats See On-Field Benefits from Union Talk, 
BUCKEYE XTRA SPORTS (Aug. 3, 2014), http://buckeyextra.dispatch.com/content/sto-
ries/2014/08/03/cats-see-on-field-benefits-from-union-talk.html. 
218. Solomon, supra note 216.  
219. Eddie Pells, NCAA President Mark Emmert Says Unionization Won’t Solve Problems, 
NCAA.COM (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2014-04-06/ncaa-president-mark-
emmert-says-unionization-wont-solve-problems. 
220. Solomon, supra note 216. 
221. Id. (emphasis added). 
222. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at *7 (2015). 
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grant-in-aid scholarship football players.223  The NLRB reasoned that asserting 
jurisdiction “would not promote stability in labor relations.”224  Specifically, the 
Northwestern University football team was just one of many other teams  
governed by the same rules to generate their success.225  Terms applied to 
Northwestern University would disrupt its relations with other teams and create 
“[in]stability in labor relations.”226  The NLRB emphasized that it had never 
before been asked to assert jurisdiction in a case involving college athletes of 
any kind, making the case “novel and unique.”227  It discussed how college  
athletes are dissimilar from graduate student assistants, student employees, such 
as janitors or cafeteria workers, and professional athletes.228   
Near the end of its decision, the NLRB made specific note that its order 
“does not preclude a reconsideration of this issue in the future.”229  Just as  
athletic directors should develop a contingency plan for compensating athletes 
for their NILs, athletic directors should prepare for possible student-athlete  
unions in the future.      
 If, in the end, grant-in-aid scholarship football players are considered 
employees and are able to unionize, athletic directors will likely have to  
consider Title IX implications.  Title IX may entitle female student-athletes to 
similar benefits even if they are not considered employees and do not participate 
in the bargaining process.230   
Sexism in the marketplace, such as football generating more revenue than 
women’s sports, does not excuse discrimination by universities based on sex.231  
Athletic directors cannot allow their athletic departments to provide a higher 
quality athletic experience to one sex, even if the higher quality experience is 
obtained through collective bargaining.232  If grant-in-aid scholarship football 
players are allowed to unionize and obtain benefits such as health insurance 
through collective bargaining, then that same benefit must be extended to a  
proportionate number of female student-athletes.233  Thus, athletic directors 
                                                          
223. Id. at *3. 
224. Id.  
225. Id. at *5. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at *4. 
228. Id.  
229. Id. at *6. 
230. Erin E. Buzuvis, Athletic Compensation for Women Too? Title IX Implications of Northwestern 
and O'Bannon, 41 J.C. & U.L. 297, 327–28 (2015). 
231. Id. at 326. 
232. See id. at 321–31. 
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must prepare for the possibility of deciding which female athletes will receive 
benefits that are bargained for by grant-in-aid scholarship football players.234 
B. Conference Autonomy 
The NCAA Division I Board of Directors adopted a new Division I  
governance structure on August 7, 2014.235  Under this new structure, athletic 
directors have an increased impact on decision making and additional  
responsibilities.236  Athletic directors now make up 60% of the new Division I 
Board of Directors and will have a vote on the Board for the first time.237  This 
Division I Board of Directors gave sixty-five universities that make up the 
Power Five Conferences (SEC, ACC, Big Ten, Pac-12, and Big 12) autonomy 
to create their own legislation.238  A proposal goes through four stages before it 
becomes legislation.239  First, a concept must be developed and proposed.240  
Second, the NCAA Division I Board of Directors, NCAA Division I Council, 
or any Division I conference must sponsor the proposal.241  For a proposal  
related to Division I football, the proposal can be sponsored by only the Division 
I council or an FBS or FCS conference.242  Third, the proposal must be 
drafted.243  Fourth, the proposal then goes through a timeline unique to  
autonomy universities where the drafted proposal is discussed, reviewed, and 
modified before it is finally voted on.244  Each university has one vote; three 
student-athletes from each of the Power 5 Conferences are also able to vote.245  
The legislation is adopted if one of two scenarios exists.246  The first scenario 
requires majority vote of three of the five conferences and 60% of total votes.247  
The second scenario requires majority vote of four of the five conferences and 
                                                          
234. Id. 
235. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, ADs Key to Restructuring Success, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 13, 2014), 
http://www.ncaa.org/champion/ads-key-restructuring-success. 
236. Id.  
237. Id.  
238. Jon Solomon, NCAA Adopts New Division I Model Giving Power 5 Autonomy, CBSSPORTS 
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24651709/ncaa-adopts-
new-division-i-model-giving-power-5-autonomy. 
239. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 167, art. 5.3.2. 
240. Id.  
241. Id. art. 5.3.2.2.2.1. 
242. Id.  
243. Id. art. 5.3.2. 
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245. Id. art. 5.3.2.1.7.1. 
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a simple majority of total votes.248 
The inherent control of the new governance structure does not give the 
Power 5 Conferences absolute authority to do whatever they wish, rather they 
are given “authority to adopt or amend legislation that is identified as an area 
of autonomy.”249  Areas of autonomy include: Athletics Personnel, Insurance 
and Career Transition, Promotional Activities Unrelated to Athletics  
Participation, Recruiting Restrictions, Pre-enrollment Expenses and Support, 
Financial Aid, Awards, Benefits and Expenses, Academic Support, Health and 
Wellness, Meals and Nutrition, and finally, Time Demands.250  Autonomy is a 
step toward more balanced and more efficient NCAA governance; athletic  
directors and other voting members of the Power 5 Conferences must make  
decisions that are within the scope and nature of the relevant area of  
autonomy.251 
 In January 2015, universities in the Power 5 Conferences first voted to 
approve increasing scholarship amounts for student-athletes to include the full 
cost of attendance.252  Second, they adopted legislation not to cut a  
student-athlete’s scholarship for athletic reasons.253  Third, they adopted  
legislation to permit student-athletes to borrow against their future earnings  
potential through loss-of-value insurance.254   
 With great power comes great responsibility.  In just the first year since 
the Power 5 Conferences created the first official proposal to become  
autonomous in December of 2014, the group has already created at least  
twenty-four additional proposals to amend the NCAA Bylaws.255  The Power 5 
Conferences have not yet been able to evaluate the effects of their first adopted 
amendments over the course of one year.  Although adopted legislation that  
allows student-athletes to receive scholarships up to the full cost of attendance 
is within the scope of the financial aid area of autonomy, athletic directors might 
experience unintended, negative consequences in the form of discontinued  
                                                          
248. Id. art. 5.3.2.1.7.2. 
249. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 167, art. 5.3.2.1.1 (emphasis added). 
250. Id. art. 5.3.2.1.2 (a)–(k). 
251. Id. art. 4.2.2 (j). 
252. Hosick, supra note 174. 
253. Id. 
254. Id.  
255. See NCAA, OFFICIAL NOTICE OF AUTONOMY PROPOSALS – DIVISION I (2014) (including  
Proposals 2014-11through 2014-14); NCAA, 2015-16 DIVISION I AUTONOMY PUBLICATION OF 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION (2015), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2015-16%20NCAA% 
20Division%20I%20Autonomy%20POPL_92515.pdf (including Proposals 2015-15 through 2015-28).  
GREENBERG_EVRARD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/26/2016  4:50 PM 
814 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 26:2 
non-revenue producing sports.256  The millions of dollars that are now used to 
cover full cost of attendance must come from somewhere.257   
C.  Budget Management and Revenue Generation 
 The athletic director of today must find ways to generate revenue to keep 
pace with rising expenses in university athletic programs.  This task is difficult 
amidst financially struggling universities.  Universities, in general, nearly  
doubled the amount of debt that they incurred in the last decade.258  One reason 
why universities incur additional debt is because they want to maintain high 
levels of spending to increase brand recognition, student demand, and donor 
support.259  However, most universities are unable to keep up with their  
spending because their revenues are down due to shrinking state educational 
funds and declines in attendance.260   
Another contributor to this phenomenon is university spending on athletic 
programs.  Because the vast majority of university athletic programs operate at 
a loss, universities contribute subsidies to their respective athletic programs.261  
Similar to increasing spending on the academic side of higher education, an 
arms race occurs on the athletic side as university athletic programs create new 
facilities and upgrade existing ones.262  Syracuse University Athletic Director 
Mark Coyle is tasked with updating the aging Carrier Dome.263  Unfortunately, 
his budget is tighter than most because private universities, such as Syracuse, 
receive little or no state funds for facility upgrades.264 
More expenses exist from the costs of students.  Unlike the spending on the 
academic side of higher education, the ratio of money spent on student-athletes 
                                                          
256. Carter, supra note 187. 
257. Powers, supra note 184. 
258. Jeffrey J. Selingo, Colleges Struggling to Stay Afloat, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/education/edlife/many-colleges-and-universities-face-financial-
problems.html. 
259. Tyler Kingkade, College Sports Spending Poses Big Risk to University Budgets, Moody’s 
Warns, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/15/college-
sports-budgets_n_4099324.html. 
260. Selingo, supra note 259.  
261. Kingkade, supra note 260.  
262. KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, COLLEGE SPORTS 101: A PRIMER ON 
MONEY, ATHLETICS, AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 16 (2009), http://www.knight-
foundation.org/media/uploads/publication_pdfs/2009_KCIA_College_Sports_101.pdf. 
263. Chris Carlson, The 7 Biggest Challenges Facing Syracuse’s New Athletic Director, SYRACUSE 
(June 18, 2015), http://www.syracuse.com/orangesports/index.ssf/2015/06/7_reasons_potential_ath-
letic_directors_might_not_want_the_syracuse_job.html. 
264. Id.  
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to regular students is lopsided.  “The Knight Commission says Division I 
schools with football spent $91,936 per athlete in 2010, seven times the  
spending per student of $13,628. Division I universities without football spent 
$39,201 per athlete, more than triple the average student spending.”265  NCAA 
data shows that only 16.2% of spending at Division I football universities goes 
to student aid; the rest is disbursed to salaries, game expenses, and facilities.266  
With the approval of athletic scholarships up to the full cost of attendance, the 
16.2% of Division I spending on student aid will increase.   
Taxes are another expense that should concern athletic directors, especially 
athletic directors at private universities that are not exempt from income tax 
under the broad constitutional doctrine of inter-governmental tax immunity or 
section 115 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) like public universities are.267  
Private universities and their athletic departments are exempt from paying  
corporate income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the IRC.268  Section 501(c)(3) 
protects organizations that are both charitable and educational.269  Universities, 
by virtue of being educational institutions, fall under a category of organizations 
presumed to be charitable by section 501(c)(3).270  Notably, the NCAA is also 
exempt because it is an organization that operates in educational activities by 
promoting amateur athletics.271  Although the NCAA and university athletic 
programs are defined as exempt organizations, there are three operational  
limitations that create concern as applied to college athletics.272  
The first limitation is unreasonable “private inurement,” which prohibits an 
organization from paying unreasonable compensation to members inside the  
organization.273  When applying private inurement to college sports, the  
compensation received by athletic directors and college coaches is a red flag.  
In 2013, David Williams of Vanderbilt University (Vanderbilt) was the highest 
paid athletic director in the country; he received $3.23 million from  
Vanderbilt.274  Williams’ payout was 629% higher than the average of Division 
                                                          
265. Cliff Peale, Athletics Cost Colleges, Students Millions, USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/15/athletics-cost-colleges-students-mil-
lions/2814455/. 
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267. John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption and College Athletics, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 109, 
134 (2010). 
268. Id. at 113. 
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I athletic directors.275  Also, it was more than twice as much as the second  
highest paid athletic director.276  The highest salary for a college basketball 
coach for the 2014–2015 season was $6.55 million paid to John Calipari by 
Kentucky, which is 888% higher than the NCAA average of approximately 
$737,392.277  Similarly, the highest salary for a college football coach for the 
2014–2015 season was $6.9 million paid to Nick Saban by the University of 
Alabama, which is 394% higher than the FBS average of approximately $1.75 
million.278  “In most instances the college coach is the highest paid state  
employee of a public institution . . . .”279  Although earnings of university  
athletic program employees seem unjustifiably excessive, they are the market 
prices for demanding positions, and therefore, not unreasonable.280 
The second limitation is “private benefit,” which can actually apply to  
individuals or entities outside the organization or to transactions entered into at 
fair market value; the key question is whether or not the benefits to private  
individuals or entities excessively outweigh the charitable benefits.281   
Applying the private benefit limitation to college sports, one view is that  
television networks receive a benefit that greatly exceeds the benefit received 
by student-athletes.282  This is unlikely because the television networks’ benefit 
comes after the significant price it negotiates for and pays to the NCAA and 
university athletic programs.  The value received by the NCAA and university 
athletic programs is then distributed among the athletes in the form of  
scholarships and improved facilities, equipment, or athletic opportunities. 
The third limitation is “commerciality,” which may prevent an organization, 
even a charity, from receiving the tax exemption if it runs a “significant  
commercial business.”283  The key questions related to whether or not a  
                                                          
275. Erik Brady et al., Major College ADs Averaging More than $500,000 in Pay, USA TODAY 
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276. Upton & Berkowitz, supra note 100.  
277. Jim Baumbach, Huge Performance Bonuses Commonplace for NCAA Basketball Coaches, 
NEWSDAY (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.newsday.com/sports/college/college-basketball/huge-perfor-
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279. Martin J. Greenberg & Thom Park, CEOs in Headphones—Financial Engineering 3 (2013), 
https://law.marquette.edu/assets/sports-law/pdf/CEOs-in-Headphones.pdf.  
280. Colombo, supra note 268, at 120–21. 
281. Id. at 122. 
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commercial business is charitable are, whether or not its business is substantial 
and if so, whether or not it is in furtherance of an exempt purpose.284  Applied 
to college athletics, it is likely that college athletics can be considered  
substantial given the media packages, coach and athletic director compensation, 
time spent on athletic activities, and hundreds of millions of dollars that flow 
through the industry.285  However, whether or not a private university athletic 
program is a business in furtherance of the exempt purpose of charity or for 
education is less clear because neither the courts nor the IRS provide a clear 
explanation of what “in furtherance of” means.  One viewpoint is that university 
athletic programs and the NCAA are commercial organizations because they 
price their products to maximize profits and purchase commercial  
advertisements.286  But an opposing viewpoint is that these same profits fund 
non-revenue generating sports and student-athlete scholarships.287   
 There are two pending cases that could also impact costs to university 
athletic programs via payments to student-athletes.  The first case In re NCAA 
Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litigation288 is in settlement discussions at 
the time this Article was written.  The plaintiffs in this multidistrict litigation 
are current and former collegiate athletes who sued the NCAA on a class action 
basis, claiming that the NCAA breached certain contractual obligations and 
common law duties to the plaintiffs in the way it handled student-athlete  
concussions and concussion-related risks.289  After conducting extensive  
discovery, the parties engaged in a lengthy mediation process.”290  A proposed 
settlement of $75 million was rejected by the lead plaintiff Adrian Arrington.291 
 The second case Jenkins v. NCAA292 is collecting support for a class  
action at the time this Article was written.  Jenkins contends that any cap on 
student-athlete compensation, including up to the full cost of attendance, is  
unlawful.293  United States District Court Judge Claudia Wilken, who ruled 
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No. 13 C 9116, 2014 WL 7237208 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2014). 
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291. Jon Solomon, NCPA: Lead Plaintiff in NCAA Concussion Case Opposes Settlement, 
CBSSPORTS (June 9, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solo-
mon/25209963/ncpa-lead-plaintiff-in-ncaa-concussion-case-opposes-settlement.  
292. See generally Jenkins v. NCAA, 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015).  
293. Daniel A. Kaufman & John G. Long, Keeping Score on NCAA Student-Athlete Rules: Can  
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against the NCAA in O’Bannon, was assigned to this case.294   
In light of current rising costs and threats of future costs looming, successful 
athletic directors will find a way to offset the difference.  Some strategies are to 
slow down facility growth or decrease salaries; however, sometimes those  
options are just not realistic.295  An increasing trend is cutting non-revenue  
generating sports teams from athletic programs.296  However, this contradicts 
an athletic director’s duties to ensure the fiscal integrity of the program and  
uphold NCAA principles that promote opportunities for student-athletes, not 
take them away.297   
Alternatively, the following is a list of suggested revenue generating ideas 
by various athletic directors: 
1. Group Funds 
Some athletic directors propose expansion of the NCAA Student Assistance 
Fund.298  The purpose of this fund is to provide student-athletes with up to $500 
per semester for minor expenses.299  Most of the money in the fund emanates 
the NCAA’s $10.8 billion media rights contract with CBS.300  Expanding this 
fund is a reasonable method for athletic directors to increase revenue to help 
cover part of the full cost of attendance because the NCAA Student Assistance 
Fund is a system that is already in place.301  Similarly, Conference USA created 
a $6.3 million pool from which its members may take out up to $450,000 each 
at any time over the next three years.302 
2. Social Media 
The University of Southern California (USC) found success using social 
                                                          
REV. (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/keeping-score-ncaa-student-athlete-rules-
can-student-athletes-receive-pay-to-play.  
294. See generally Jenkins, 311 F.R.D. 532.  
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media sponsorships in its social media accounts (i.e., Facebook, Twitter,  
Instagram, etc.).303  USC’s media rights holder Fox Sports said that the revenue 
received from these new social media sponsorship agreements is approaching 
the “mid-six figures” on an annual basis.304  Although this seems like easy,  
sustainable money considering the popularity of social media, IMG College, the 
largest college sports marketing company, says that it is still too early to tell.305  
However, keeping in mind the uniqueness of college sports and fans’ attitudes 
towards tradition, some athletic programs might remain at arms-length from  
social media; too much publicity could dilute their brands. 
3. Fundraising 
It is no secret that athletic directors engage with alumni and donors to  
maintain a positive relationship with some of the biggest supporters of the  
university athletic program.  Athletic directors implement other ways to raise 
funds, too.  At larger universities, where there is high demand for tickets to 
football and basketball games, athletic directors can charge for ticket priority.306  
Ticket priority is a payment in the form of a donation by a fan seeking season 
tickets; it is paid on top of the normal season ticket price to increase the  
likelihood of receiving a premium seat.307  A fair number of fans are willing to 
pay the ticket priority price because the extra payment is a donation and it is 
80% tax deductible, per IRS guidelines.308 
4. Raised Prices:  
San Diego State University Athletic Director Jim Sterk decided to raise 
ticket prices.309  He informed season ticket holders that basketball ticket prices 
would increase to help the athletic program cover the new full cost of attendance 
payments.310  Most of the hikes in price were in donor sections increasing price 
by 20%.311  Other sections were re-classified to a more expensive section and 
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increased by 68%.312  Athletic directors should be cautious to avoid upsetting 
donors if they use this method.  Smaller universities that rarely have the  
opportunity to charge a ticket priority fee use more direct methods.  In 2015, 
Georgia State charged students an athletics fee of $554.313  Student fees are a 
practice that athletic directors should tread lightly on. 
D.  Institutional Control 
It seems like we can count on a new major university athletic scandal  
emerging every few years or so.  Scandals are extremely harmful to all  
stakeholders involved because reputations of individuals and the university  
involved may be severely damaged.314  As overseers of their athletic programs, 
athletic directors must do all they can to prevent scandals from occurring.   
Scandals vary in subject matter, people involved, length of time over which they 
occurred, and sanctions imposed.315  This section focuses on major scandals 
involving more than just a few rogue individuals.  The common denominator of 
scandals is that they each violate at least one subsection of the NCAA principle 
of Institutional Control and Responsibility, or Bylaw 2.1.316  The principle 
broadly states that “[i]t is the responsibility of each member institution to  
control its intercollegiate athletics program in compliance with the rules and 
regulations of the [NCAA].”317  Furthermore, each institution is responsible “for 
the actions of its staff members and for the actions of any other individual or 
organization engaged in activities promoting the athletics interest of the  
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institution.”318  University presidents and chancellors are recognized as the  
ultimate authorities of the athletic programs of their institutions.319  However, 
athletic directors can be given institutional control alone or shared with the 
president or chancellor.320 
 When athletic directors and compliance personnel do not actively watch 
for signs of possible violations, they can unintentionally enable an environment 
for scandal.  This is exactly what happened at the University of Miami  
(Miami).321  The story originally surfaced in a Yahoo! Sports article; the article 
was based on an interview with Nevin Shapiro, who was a party to a $930  
million Ponzi scheme.322  Shapiro claimed to have provided all types of illegal 
benefits like cash, prostitution, jewelry, electronics, nights out at strip clubs, and 
access to houses and yachts to student-athletes at Miami.323  In the past, the 
NCAA noted that “institutions have a greater responsibility to monitor athletics 
representatives with ‘insider’ or favored status.”324  Here, this applied to Miami 
because of its relationship with Shapiro, which involved the institution naming 
a student-athlete lounge after him, allowing him to lead the football team out of 
the locker room, and granting him access to the sidelines during football 
games.325  Assessing whether or not the institution lacked control, the NCAA 
considered the overall “culture” of the athletic program.326  It considered 
whether or not  
 
i. adequate compliance measures exist;  
ii. those compliance measures were appropriately  
conveyed to those who need to be aware of them; 
iii. the compliance measures are monitored to ensure they 
are followed; and  
iv. upon learning that a violation may have occurred, the 
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institution takes timely and appropriate action.327  
  
Ultimately, the NCAA determined that Miami lacked institutional  
control.328  The NCAA stated that Miami’s compliance measures were  
insufficient because many staff members, mainly coaches, reported inconsistent 
understanding of several policies, such as how and when to document phone 
calls or visits with recruits.329  The continuous lack of proper communication of 
policies and lack of monitoring conduct lead to the growth of a culture that did 
not value compliance policies and procedures.330  However, Miami claims that 
it “went to great lengths” to foster a culture of compliance through rules  
education.331  Unfortunately, rules education alone is not enough; several  
members of the institution provided a poor understanding of the rules.332  The 
culture at Miami seems to suggest that compliance rules were not valued, as 
evidenced by the fact that none of the thirty-eight program members involved 
in the violations took any steps to report any of the violations.333  In its report, 
the NCAA noted that if effective compliance measures were monitored, the  
violations could have been prevented or deterred.334  Some specific compliance 
measures, mentioned only briefly by the NCAA, included more frequent  
documentation of interactions with boosters and recruits, and better systems to 
monitor text messages and phone calls.335 
In the Miami infractions report, the NCAA mentioned multiple ways in 
which athletic program leaders could have taken better steps to create a  
pro-compliance culture, mainly by being proactive while monitoring institution 
compliance.336  One example is using strategy, such as anticipating where  
violations are most likely to occur.337  Another example is following through 
with information about a potential violation.338  Advances in technology also 
provide easy ways for university athletic programs to monitor themselves.   
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Software from tech company JumpForward features a Compliance Toolbox that 
allows compliance departments to easily monitor many different areas of  
compliance, such as all phone calls, text messages, and e-mails sent to  
prospective student-athletes.339 
The sex scandal at Louisville came to light when Katina Powell released 
her book entitled Breaking Cardinal Rules wherein she claims to have hired 
escorts on twenty-two occasions between 2010 and 2014 for men’s basketball 
players.340  She claims that these gatherings were organized by former  
Louisville basketball staffer Andre McGee.341  Louisville Head Basketball 
Coach Rick Pitino stated that he does not know if it is true.342  Investigations are 
ongoing at this time, so it is difficult to determine with certainty who knew and 
who was involved.  Regardless of the outcome, the allegations alone are enough 
to damage the reputation of the athletic program at the University of Louisville.   
From an athletic director perspective, the Louisville scandal may serve as 
an example of how difficult it is to know every activity of every person  
associated with the athletic program.  Louisville President James Ramsay  
released a statement that reads, “For the past 18 years, Tom Jurich has served 
as athletic director of an exemplary program at U of L . . . [he is] committed to 
the values that are fundamental to the success of Cardinal athletics.”343  Jurich 
was ranked number one in a list compiled of the top twenty-five athletic  
directors in the country.344  The rankings consider areas such as athletic success, 
stability, national respect, and avoidance of scandals and NCAA issues.345  Even 
the most careful, compliant athletic directors are not immune from scandals.   
When it comes to major university athletic program scandals, there is a  
consistent presence of a culture, not just a few individuals, that does not value 
compliance rules.  Although the NCAA makes some recommendations in its 
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infractions reports, which are all in hindsight, the recommendations are still  
valuable to athletic directors because they provide insight into how to fix  
weaknesses in compliance.  Athletic directors should learn from their own  
mistakes and the mistakes of others as a way to improve their own compliance 
strategies. Scandals are a way to lose jobs, donor support, reputation, and the 
integrity of the athletic program and university. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 The athletic director of today plays an expanded role in university  
athletic programs.  Instead of performing duties focused on socializing with  
donors or sitting down with a calendar to create competition schedules, athletic 
directors now resemble CEOs and plan capital campaigns, master legal  
concepts, and sign multimillion dollar agreements.  Athletic directors also now 
have more power in NCAA Division I governance through autonomy.  There 
are several paths to the head athletic director chair, but one is causing a  
stir—the business outsider with minimal experience in college sports.  The shift 
to this path has returned questionable results evidenced by the unsuccessful  
tenures of Dave Brandon at Michigan and Stephen Patterson at Texas.  Their 
lack of success may suggest that the athletic director position requires skills 
unique to college sports, such as recognizing where the line is between  
university tradition and profits. 
 Another concept unique to college athletics is the principle of  
amateurism.  It is the backbone of the college sports model as we know it.  Legal 
and other regulatory entities like the NLRB are closer than ever to removing 
amateurism from the college sports.  Athletic directors must uphold these  
principles of amateurism by duty in their contracts, but also because of the  
danger it poses to non-revenue generating sports, which would likely be  
eliminated because their funding would be paid to student-athletes of men’s 
basketball and football.  Another reason why amateurism is important to athletic 
directors is that it sets up the possibility of a scandal if it is not frequently  
reinforced and monitored by compliance employees.  Finally, in a time where 
universities are spending more than ever, athletic directors must find new  
revenue streams to obtain sufficient funds to pay student-athletes up to the full 
cost of attendance.  Between the risks of scandal, collapse of the amateurism 
model, and the unique skills required to successfully run a university athletic 
program, athletic directors earn every penny. 
